The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 93
... random sequence of red or green lights , whether red or green will come up next . Subjects appar- ently persist in guessing on the basis of some pattern they think they perceive , an " irrational " mode of behavior given their knowledge ...
... random sequence of red or green lights , whether red or green will come up next . Subjects appar- ently persist in guessing on the basis of some pattern they think they perceive , an " irrational " mode of behavior given their knowledge ...
Page 97
... random and defy you to have a better than random chance of guessing what I name . But if the game is that I do want you to guess correctly and you know that I will try to pick one that facilitates your guess , the random device can only ...
... random and defy you to have a better than random chance of guessing what I name . But if the game is that I do want you to guess correctly and you know that I will try to pick one that facilitates your guess , the random device can only ...
Page 182
... random from the universe of burglars will be deterred by some specified probability of apprehension and conviction presumably varies directly with the latter probability ; the simple model analyzed above treats burglars as divisible ...
... random from the universe of burglars will be deterred by some specified probability of apprehension and conviction presumably varies directly with the latter probability ; the simple model analyzed above treats burglars as divisible ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game