The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 18
... rational in decision and motivation . Many of the attributes of rationality , as in several illustrations mentioned earlier , are strategic disabilities in certain conflict situations . It may be perfectly rational to wish oneself not ...
... rational in decision and motivation . Many of the attributes of rationality , as in several illustrations mentioned earlier , are strategic disabilities in certain conflict situations . It may be perfectly rational to wish oneself not ...
Page 279
... rational player " expects " in relation to another rational player , poses a problem in sheer scientific description . Both players , being rational , must recognize that the only kind of " rational " expectation they can have is a ...
... rational player " expects " in relation to another rational player , poses a problem in sheer scientific description . Both players , being rational , must recognize that the only kind of " rational " expectation they can have is a ...
Page 280
... rational - solution " postulate ; it is the second that constitutes the " symmetry " postulate . - The question now is whether the symmetry postulate is de- rived from the players ' rationality — the rationality of their ex- pectations ...
... rational - solution " postulate ; it is the second that constitutes the " symmetry " postulate . - The question now is whether the symmetry postulate is de- rived from the players ' rationality — the rationality of their ex- pectations ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game