The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 167
... rational players can keep a war limited in Southeast Asia , using conventional and atomic weapons , or in a battle ... rational players have the intellectual capacity to rise above these details of the game and ignore them ; the ...
... rational players can keep a war limited in Southeast Asia , using conventional and atomic weapons , or in a battle ... rational players have the intellectual capacity to rise above these details of the game and ignore them ; the ...
Page 283
... players jointly expect a priori the same outcome , and con- fidently recognize it as their common expectation , they ... rational players , through anything other than sheer coincidence or magic , to focus their attention on the same ...
... players jointly expect a priori the same outcome , and con- fidently recognize it as their common expectation , they ... rational players , through anything other than sheer coincidence or magic , to focus their attention on the same ...
Page 295
... rational players find useful.3 ― The suggestion of this appendix , then , is that an important property enjoyed by a " solution in the strict sense " — a reason why rational players might select it is a signaling power , a means of ...
... rational players find useful.3 ― The suggestion of this appendix , then , is that an important property enjoyed by a " solution in the strict sense " — a reason why rational players might select it is a signaling power , a means of ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game