The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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We thus limit the applicability of any results we reach. If our interest is the study of
actual behavior, the results we reach under this constraint may prove to be either
a good approximation of reality or a caricature. Any abstraction runs a risk of ...
... classes— those, let us say, who steal for money and are certainly deterred in
accordance with the numbers of the matrix, and those who steal for fun and are
beyond reach of any threat of the magnitude entered in the lower right-hand cell.
And each player knows this. The most informative way to characterize the game,
then, is not that the players must reach overt agreement by the time the final bell
rings or forego the rewards altogether. It is that they must reach overt agreement
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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