The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 68
... reason for a measure of uniformity , and sometimes there is enough similarity in the circumstances to ex- plain similar outcomes ; but more often it seems that there is simply no heart left in the bargaining when it takes place under ...
... reason for a measure of uniformity , and sometimes there is enough similarity in the circumstances to ex- plain similar outcomes ; but more often it seems that there is simply no heart left in the bargaining when it takes place under ...
Page 179
... reasons for failure , there is perhaps some probability that the threat will fail . If we take it into account we may have a reason for Row to wish that the " puni- tive " payoffs in the lower right - hand cell were not quite as un ...
... reasons for failure , there is perhaps some probability that the threat will fail . If we take it into account we may have a reason for Row to wish that the " puni- tive " payoffs in the lower right - hand cell were not quite as un ...
Page 298
... reason or an excuse for believing or pretending that ( ii , II ) is better than ( i , I ) ; since we need an excuse , if not a reason , for pretending , if not be- lieving , that one of the equilibrium pairs is better , or more dis ...
... reason or an excuse for believing or pretending that ( ii , II ) is better than ( i , I ) ; since we need an excuse , if not a reason , for pretending , if not be- lieving , that one of the equilibrium pairs is better , or more dis ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game