The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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Sometimes, to be sure, there is a reason for a measure of uniformity, and
sometimes there is enough similarity in the circumstances to explain similar
outcomes; but more often it seems that there is simply no heart left in the
bargaining when it ...
Whatever the reasons for failure, there is perhaps some probability that the threat
will fail. If we take it into account we may have a reason for Row to wish that the “
punitive” payoffs in the lower right-hand cell were not quite as unattractive as ...
They provide either a reason or an excuse for believing or pretending that (ii, II) is
better than (i, I); since we need an excuse, if not a reason, for pretending, if not
believing, that one of the equilibrium pairs is better, or more distinguished, ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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