The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 179
... reduce somewhat the high cost of failure . If , for example , he can commit himself not to a choice of row ii in the ... reducing the seriousness of the risk of failure . We can be more specific . Let P stand for the probability that the ...
... reduce somewhat the high cost of failure . If , for example , he can commit himself not to a choice of row ii in the ... reducing the seriousness of the risk of failure . We can be more specific . Let P stand for the probability that the ...
Page 182
... reduce a threat by reducing the probability of its fulfillment reduces the expected value of the outcome proportionately for both players , while a П it direct reduction in size might not be restricted to proportionate 182 STRATEGY WITH ...
... reduce a threat by reducing the probability of its fulfillment reduces the expected value of the outcome proportionately for both players , while a П it direct reduction in size might not be restricted to proportionate 182 STRATEGY WITH ...
Page 244
... reduce the likeli- hood that his attack will succeed - if they raise the likelihood that we can retaliate severely — we may want to make a quick demonstration to the enemy that we are ready , in the hope that our improved posture will ...
... reduce the likeli- hood that his attack will succeed - if they raise the likelihood that we can retaliate severely — we may want to make a quick demonstration to the enemy that we are ready , in the hope that our improved posture will ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game