The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 89
... relation be- tween the players : in the common - interest game we can refer to them as " partners " and in the pure - conflict game as " opponents " or " adversaries " ; but the mixed relation that is involved in wars , strikes ...
... relation be- tween the players : in the common - interest game we can refer to them as " partners " and in the pure - conflict game as " opponents " or " adversaries " ; but the mixed relation that is involved in wars , strikes ...
Page 171
... relation between political and military objectives . If this relation- ship is lost , any war is likely to grow by imperceptible stages into one all - out effort " ( Henry A. Kissinger , Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy [ New York ...
... relation between political and military objectives . If this relation- ship is lost , any war is likely to grow by imperceptible stages into one all - out effort " ( Henry A. Kissinger , Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy [ New York ...
Page 271
... relation to the cooperative game was heuristic : it was to help to discover what might consti- tute " rational expectations " ( and hence the indicated rational outcome ) in the corresponding cooperative game . The argument of the ...
... relation to the cooperative game was heuristic : it was to help to discover what might consti- tute " rational expectations " ( and hence the indicated rational outcome ) in the corresponding cooperative game . The argument of the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game