The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 53
Thomas C. Schelling. 3 BARGAINING , COMMUNICATION , AND LIMITED WAR Limited war requires limits ; so do strategic maneuvers if they are to be stabilized short of war . But limits require agreement or at least some kind of mutual ...
Thomas C. Schelling. 3 BARGAINING , COMMUNICATION , AND LIMITED WAR Limited war requires limits ; so do strategic maneuvers if they are to be stabilized short of war . But limits require agreement or at least some kind of mutual ...
Page 129
... requires attention to the penalties on promises as well as on threats . Since the physical and institu- tional ... require penalties of at least 1 on a promise by Column or by Row . Note that in the case of a promise extracted by a ...
... requires attention to the penalties on promises as well as on threats . Since the physical and institu- tional ... require penalties of at least 1 on a promise by Column or by Row . Note that in the case of a promise extracted by a ...
Page 235
... requires the enemy to triple the size of his attack may substantially increase the enemy's dif- ficulty of sneaking ... require several missiles to get a direct enough hit . Thus zonal limitations on the placement of ICBM's might seem an ...
... requires the enemy to triple the size of his attack may substantially increase the enemy's dif- ficulty of sneaking ... require several missiles to get a direct enough hit . Thus zonal limitations on the placement of ICBM's might seem an ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game