The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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3 BARGAINING, COMMUNICATION, AND LIMITED WAR Limited war requires
limits; so do strategic maneuvers if they are to be stabilized short of war. But limits
require agreement or at least some kind of mutual recognition and acquiescence.
Full analysis in this case requires attention to the penalties on promises as well
as on threats. Since the physical and institutional arrangements for promises (that
is, for commitments to the second party) are generally of a quite different nature ...
Similarly, a defense of Chicago that requires the enemy to triple the size of his
attack may be a poor prospect; it may mean only that he invests in a larger initial
attack. But a defense of our retaliatory force that requires the enemy to triple the ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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