The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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We have considered the possibility that a retaliatory threat may be more credible
if the means of carrying it out and the responsibility for retaliation are placed in
the hands of those whose resolution is strongest, as in recent suggestions for ...
Between the threats of massive retaliation and of limited war there is the
possibility of less-than-massive retaliation, of graduated reprisal. Few serious
analyses of war of limited reprisal have been published.” The idea that one might
“take out” ...
But a defense of our retaliatory force that requires the enemy to triple the size of
his attack may substantially increase the ... of sneaking past our warning system,
and appreciably change his likelihood of successfully precluding retaliation.
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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