The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 233
... retaliatory forces . If these forces were them- selves invulnerable if each side were confident that its own forces could survive an attack , but also that it could not destroy the other's power to strike back - there would be no ...
... retaliatory forces . If these forces were them- selves invulnerable if each side were confident that its own forces could survive an attack , but also that it could not destroy the other's power to strike back - there would be no ...
Page 235
... retaliation . Similarly , a defense of Chicago that requires the enemy to triple the size of his attack may be a poor prospect ; it may mean only that he invests in a larger initial attack . But a defense of our retaliatory force that ...
... retaliation . Similarly , a defense of Chicago that requires the enemy to triple the size of his attack may be a poor prospect ; it may mean only that he invests in a larger initial attack . But a defense of our retaliatory force that ...
Page 243
... retaliatory forces by the sheer provision of cement , or , if not impossible , exceedingly costly . Mobility and concealment may then have to be the source of security for the retaliatory forces ; if the enemy can hit anything he can ...
... retaliatory forces by the sheer provision of cement , or , if not impossible , exceedingly costly . Mobility and concealment may then have to be the source of security for the retaliatory forces ; if the enemy can hit anything he can ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game