The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 191
... risk of general war.1 Here again is a threat that all - out war may occur , not that it certainly will occur , if the other party engages in certain actions . Again , whether it does or does not occur is not a matter alto- gether ...
... risk of general war.1 Here again is a threat that all - out war may occur , not that it certainly will occur , if the other party engages in certain actions . Again , whether it does or does not occur is not a matter alto- gether ...
Page 193
... risk , though numerically small , was appreciable . RISKY BEHAVIOR IN LIMITED WAR If one of the functions of limited war , then , is to pose the de- liberate risk of all - out war , in order to intimidate the enemy and to make pursuit ...
... risk , though numerically small , was appreciable . RISKY BEHAVIOR IN LIMITED WAR If one of the functions of limited war , then , is to pose the de- liberate risk of all - out war , in order to intimidate the enemy and to make pursuit ...
Page 198
... risk that both it and Russia ( and the rest of the world ) will be engaged in all - out war in the near future , a war that neither it nor Russia wants . The country is saying in effect , " If you do not get out of Hungary , we may ...
... risk that both it and Russia ( and the rest of the world ) will be engaged in all - out war in the near future , a war that neither it nor Russia wants . The country is saying in effect , " If you do not get out of Hungary , we may ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game