The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 167
... rules of the game , " are not discovered early , will they be discovered at all ? Is mutually suc- cessful play more likely if the general philosophy of each player is to begin with " tight " rules or highly " limited " weapons and ...
... rules of the game , " are not discovered early , will they be discovered at all ? Is mutually suc- cessful play more likely if the general philosophy of each player is to begin with " tight " rules or highly " limited " weapons and ...
Page 268
... rule for its own termination , let us look at the rules for termination first.4 If we are to avoid adding a whole new dimension to our payoff matrix , in the form of discount rates , we must suppose that the game is terminated soon ...
... rule for its own termination , let us look at the rules for termination first.4 If we are to avoid adding a whole new dimension to our payoff matrix , in the form of discount rates , we must suppose that the game is terminated soon ...
Page 283
... rule of elimination that leads to an unambiguous choice or a high probability of concerted choice . And one of these rules , or clues , or suggestions , is mathematical symmetry.16 16 The basic intellectual premise , or working ...
... rule of elimination that leads to an unambiguous choice or a high probability of concerted choice . And one of these rules , or clues , or suggestions , is mathematical symmetry.16 16 The basic intellectual premise , or working ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game