The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 67
... seems to be a strong magnetism in mathematical simplicity . A trivial illustra- tion is the tendency for the outcomes to be expressed in " round numbers " ; the salesman who works out the arithmetic for his " rock - bottom " price on ...
... seems to be a strong magnetism in mathematical simplicity . A trivial illustra- tion is the tendency for the outcomes to be expressed in " round numbers " ; the salesman who works out the arithmetic for his " rock - bottom " price on ...
Page 68
... seems that there is simply no heart left in the bargaining when it takes place under the shadow of some dramatic and conspicuous precedent . " In similar fashion , mediators often display a power to precipitate agreement and a power to ...
... seems that there is simply no heart left in the bargaining when it takes place under the shadow of some dramatic and conspicuous precedent . " In similar fashion , mediators often display a power to precipitate agreement and a power to ...
Page 72
... seems a potent one . To illustrate with the problem of agreeing explicitly on how to divided $ 100 : 50-50 seems a plausible division , but it may seem so for too many reasons . It may seem " fair " ; it may seem to balance bargaining ...
... seems a potent one . To illustrate with the problem of agreeing explicitly on how to divided $ 100 : 50-50 seems a plausible division , but it may seem so for too many reasons . It may seem " fair " ; it may seem to balance bargaining ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game