The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 68
Page 78
... side . ) The technical side of this principle would be identification of who would send and receive messages , upon what authority , over what facilities , using what intermediaries if intermediaries were used , and who stood in line to ...
... side . ) The technical side of this principle would be identification of who would send and receive messages , upon what authority , over what facilities , using what intermediaries if intermediaries were used , and who stood in line to ...
Page 236
... sides , the greater is the absolute number of mis- siles expected to be left over for retaliation in the event that either side should strike first , and therefore the greater is the deterrence to an attempted first strike . Second ...
... sides , the greater is the absolute number of mis- siles expected to be left over for retaliation in the event that either side should strike first , and therefore the greater is the deterrence to an attempted first strike . Second ...
Page 237
... side's missiles becomes less and less as the missiles on both sides increase . And the tolerance of the system increases too . For small numbers on both sides , a ratio of 2 or 3 to I may provide dominance to the larger side , a chance ...
... side's missiles becomes less and less as the missiles on both sides increase . And the tolerance of the system increases too . For small numbers on both sides , a ratio of 2 or 3 to I may provide dominance to the larger side , a chance ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game