The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 167
... stable , efficient outcome is more likely when the connotations of the game the names and interpretations that are ... stable , efficient outcome more likely between two players of similar temperament and cultural background or between ...
... stable , efficient outcome is more likely when the connotations of the game the names and interpretations that are ... stable , efficient outcome more likely between two players of similar temperament and cultural background or between ...
Page 232
... stability of the balance . The balance is stable only when neither , in striking first , can destroy the other's ability to strike back . ― - The difference between a stable and an unstable balance is illustrated by another offensive ...
... stability of the balance . The balance is stable only when neither , in striking first , can destroy the other's ability to strike back . ― - The difference between a stable and an unstable balance is illustrated by another offensive ...
Page 237
... stable deterrence , and of schemes for the prevention of surprise attack , the question of more vs. fewer weapons has to be analyzed on its merits in individual cases . It is not a foregone conclusion that disarmament , in the literal ...
... stable deterrence , and of schemes for the prevention of surprise attack , the question of more vs. fewer weapons has to be analyzed on its merits in individual cases . It is not a foregone conclusion that disarmament , in the literal ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game