The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 151
... strategy , that is , a strategy that he would follow no matter which column the other player selects . The result would be the modified matrix shown in Fig . 15 B. ( Committing himself to i " Threats , promises , and unconditional ...
... strategy , that is , a strategy that he would follow no matter which column the other player selects . The result would be the modified matrix shown in Fig . 15 B. ( Committing himself to i " Threats , promises , and unconditional ...
Page 160
... STRATEGIC MOVES " If the essence of a game of strategy is the dependence of each person's proper choice of action on what he expects the other to do , it may be useful to define a " strategic move " as follows : A strategic move is one ...
... STRATEGIC MOVES " If the essence of a game of strategy is the dependence of each person's proper choice of action on what he expects the other to do , it may be useful to define a " strategic move " as follows : A strategic move is one ...
Page 175
... strategies in zero - sum games as a means of introducing continuity of strategies into a discrete - strategy game that has no pure - strategy saddle point , thereby converting it into a game that does have a saddle point . In this ...
... strategies in zero - sum games as a means of introducing continuity of strategies into a discrete - strategy game that has no pure - strategy saddle point , thereby converting it into a game that does have a saddle point . In this ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game