The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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But, if either side can obliterate the other, what does it matter who strikes first? ...
We must assume that a Russian first-strike, if it came, would be aimed at the very
power that There is a difference between a balance of terror in which either side ...
... and enemy incentives, that we would need a minimum expectation of Ioo
missiles left over after his first counter-missile strike in order to carry out an
adequately punitive retaliatory strike — that is, to deter him from striking in the first
At one extreme is the “pure” strike-back type of weapon: the relatively inaccurate
vehicle with a super-dirty bomb that can kill ... Ideally, this weapon would suffer
no disadvantage in waiting to strike second and gain no advantage in striking first
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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