The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 232
... strike back with equal or greater force . But , if either side can obliterate the other , what does it matter who strikes first ? The answer , of course , is that we are not particularly concerned with outliving the Russians by a day ...
... strike back with equal or greater force . But , if either side can obliterate the other , what does it matter who strikes first ? The answer , of course , is that we are not particularly concerned with outliving the Russians by a day ...
Page 236
... strike in order to carry out an adequately punitive retaliatory strike — that is , to deter him from striking in the first place . For illustration suppose his accuracies and reliabilities are such that one of his missiles has a 50-50 ...
... strike in order to carry out an adequately punitive retaliatory strike — that is , to deter him from striking in the first place . For illustration suppose his accuracies and reliabilities are such that one of his missiles has a 50-50 ...
Page 240
... strike second and gain no advantage in striking first . At the opposite extreme is a weapon that is itself so vulnerable that it could not survive to strike second , or a weapon so specialized for finding and destroy- ing the enemy's ...
... strike second and gain no advantage in striking first . At the opposite extreme is a weapon that is itself so vulnerable that it could not survive to strike second , or a weapon so specialized for finding and destroy- ing the enemy's ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game