The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 63
... suggestion , and says that he made the same suggestion to the original owner . Again with- out waiting for any response , he departs . You are A ( B ) ; what claim do you write ? The outcomes in the writer's informal sample are given in ...
... suggestion , and says that he made the same suggestion to the original owner . Again with- out waiting for any response , he departs . You are A ( B ) ; what claim do you write ? The outcomes in the writer's informal sample are given in ...
Page 68
... suggestion to fill the vacuum of indeterminacy that otherwise exists : it is not the facts themselves , but the creation of a specific suggestion , that seems to exercise the influence . There is , in a similar vein , a strong ...
... suggestion to fill the vacuum of indeterminacy that otherwise exists : it is not the facts themselves , but the creation of a specific suggestion , that seems to exercise the influence . There is , in a similar vein , a strong ...
Page 144
... suggestion , but coordination requires the common acceptance of some source of suggestion . Similarly , the participants of a square dance may all be thoroughly dissatisfied with the particular dances being called , but as long as the ...
... suggestion , but coordination requires the common acceptance of some source of suggestion . Similarly , the participants of a square dance may all be thoroughly dissatisfied with the particular dances being called , but as long as the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game