The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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If each player's response to an increased danger of Surprise attack is to enhance
his own proclivity toward inadvertent attack, the probability of each player's attack
is now a rising function of the other's.” Such a warning system is the rational, ...
The surprise-attack problem, when viewed as a problem of reciprocal suspicion
and aggravated “self-defense,” suggests that there are not only secrets We prefer
not to keep, but military capabilities we might prefer not to have. Of course, it is ...
The special significance of surprise attack thus lies in the pos! sible vulnerability
of retaliatory forces. If these forces were them* Selves invulnerable—if each side
were confident that its own forces could survive an attack, but also that it could ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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