The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 207
... or between the burglar and me , is logically equivalent to the problem of two or more partners who lack confidence in each other . If each is under some temptation to abscond with the joint assets ; if The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise ...
... or between the burglar and me , is logically equivalent to the problem of two or more partners who lack confidence in each other . If each is under some temptation to abscond with the joint assets ; if The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise ...
Page 221
... attack . One's response to an in- crease in the probability of being attacked is to shift the criteria for decision that are used in the warning system in the direction of lesser likelihood of a failure to respond ... SURPRISE ATTACK 221.
... attack . One's response to an in- crease in the probability of being attacked is to shift the criteria for decision that are used in the warning system in the direction of lesser likelihood of a failure to respond ... SURPRISE ATTACK 221.
Page 233
... surprise attack thus lies in the pos- sible vulnerability of retaliatory forces . If these forces were them- selves invulnerable if each side were confident that its own forces could survive an attack , but also that it could not ...
... surprise attack thus lies in the pos- sible vulnerability of retaliatory forces . If these forces were them- selves invulnerable if each side were confident that its own forces could survive an attack , but also that it could not ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game