The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 268
... symmetry in the move structure of the game , paying close attention to the " legal details " of the bargain- ing ... symmetry in the move struc- ture and to treat asymmetry as a special case , symmetry as the more general case . an ...
... symmetry in the move structure of the game , paying close attention to the " legal details " of the bargain- ing ... symmetry in the move struc- ture and to treat asymmetry as a special case , symmetry as the more general case . an ...
Page 281
... symmetry part of the defini- tion of rationality ; to do so would destroy the empirical relevance of the theory and simply make symmetry an independent axiom . We must have a plausible definition of rationality that does not mention ...
... symmetry part of the defini- tion of rationality ; to do so would destroy the empirical relevance of the theory and simply make symmetry an independent axiom . We must have a plausible definition of rationality that does not mention ...
Page 287
... symmetry requirement as the generic characteristic of the solution , and think of the other conditions ( axioms ) as serving to refine the crude notion of symmetry to the point where a unique solution is guaranteed . See the earlier ...
... symmetry requirement as the generic characteristic of the solution , and think of the other conditions ( axioms ) as serving to refine the crude notion of symmetry to the point where a unique solution is guaranteed . See the earlier ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game