The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 69
... tacit bargaining may help to provide an under- standing of the influence at work ; and perhaps the logic of tacit bargaining even provides a basis for believing it to be ... explicit bargaining BARGAINING , COMMUNICATION , LIMITED WAR 69.
... tacit bargaining may help to provide an under- standing of the influence at work ; and perhaps the logic of tacit bargaining even provides a basis for believing it to be ... explicit bargaining BARGAINING , COMMUNICATION , LIMITED WAR 69.
Page 72
... tacit bargaining , it would be only a guess and perhaps a wild one that the same kind of psychic attraction worked in explicit bargaining ; and if all we had to generalize from were the observation of pecul- iarly " plausible " outcomes ...
... tacit bargaining , it would be only a guess and perhaps a wild one that the same kind of psychic attraction worked in explicit bargaining ; and if all we had to generalize from were the observation of pecul- iarly " plausible " outcomes ...
Page 101
... tacit bargaining provides an analytical model — perhaps only an analogy but perhaps an identification of the actual psychic and intellectual phenomenon of the " rational " process of find- ing agreement in pure bargaining situations ...
... tacit bargaining provides an analytical model — perhaps only an analogy but perhaps an identification of the actual psychic and intellectual phenomenon of the " rational " process of find- ing agreement in pure bargaining situations ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game