The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 35
Page 30
... tactic , they may try to enforce an agreement on secrecy . Intersecting Negotiations . If a union is simultaneously engaged , or will shortly be engaged , in many negotiations while the manage- ment has no other plants and deals with no ...
... tactic , they may try to enforce an agreement on secrecy . Intersecting Negotiations . If a union is simultaneously engaged , or will shortly be engaged , in many negotiations while the manage- ment has no other plants and deals with no ...
Page 137
... tactic to employ and an interesting one to study is the problem of finding a means to commitment , the available " penalty " to invoke against one's own nonperformance . There is consequently a related set of tactics that consists of ...
... tactic to employ and an interesting one to study is the problem of finding a means to commitment , the available " penalty " to invoke against one's own nonperformance . There is consequently a related set of tactics that consists of ...
Page 276
... tactic . Of course it may win for either of them ; but this may mean that we end up with something like a foot race , and the one closest to the turnstile wins . By analyzing the tactic , and its institutional or physical arrangements ...
... tactic . Of course it may win for either of them ; but this may mean that we end up with something like a foot race , and the one closest to the turnstile wins . By analyzing the tactic , and its institutional or physical arrangements ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game