The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 91
Page
... theory of bargaining , " " theory of conflict , " or " theory of strategy . " Strictly speaking , the subject falls within the theory of games , but within the part of game theory in which the least satisfactory progress has been made ...
... theory of bargaining , " " theory of conflict , " or " theory of strategy . " Strictly speaking , the subject falls within the theory of games , but within the part of game theory in which the least satisfactory progress has been made ...
Page 15
Thomas C. Schelling. tion theory , theory of evidence , theory of choice , and theory of collective decision . It is faithful to our definition of " strategy " : it takes conflict for granted , but also assumes common interest between ...
Thomas C. Schelling. tion theory , theory of evidence , theory of choice , and theory of collective decision . It is faithful to our definition of " strategy " : it takes conflict for granted , but also assumes common interest between ...
Page 164
... theory cannot be based on purely formal analysis . We cannot build either a descriptive theory or a prescriptive theory on the assumption that there are certain intellectual processes that rational players are not capable of , of the ...
... theory cannot be based on purely formal analysis . We cannot build either a descriptive theory or a prescriptive theory on the assumption that there are certain intellectual processes that rational players are not capable of , of the ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game