The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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PREFACE This is a series of closely interrelated essays in a field that is variously
described as “theory of bargaining,” “theory of conflict,” or “theory of strategy.”
Strictly speaking, the subject falls within the theory of games, but within the part of
tion theory, theory of evidence, theory of choice, and theory of collective decision.
It is faithful to our definition of “strategy”: it takes conflict for granted, but also
assumes common interest between the adversaries; it assumes a “rational” ...
But, if they can, they can do something that no purely formal game theory can
take into account; they can do better than a purely deductive game theory would
predict. And, if they can do better — if they can rise above the limitations of a
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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