The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 34
Page 25
... third party and offer a modest sum in consideration of the latter's releasing the buyer from the bet , threatening to sell the house for $ 16,000 if the release is not forth- coming . The effect of the betas of most such contractual com ...
... third party and offer a modest sum in consideration of the latter's releasing the buyer from the bet , threatening to sell the house for $ 16,000 if the release is not forth- coming . The effect of the betas of most such contractual com ...
Page 87
... third payoff would show Holmes and Moriarty both being rewarded if they succeed in getting off at the same station , but Holmes gaining more if both he and Moriarty get off at one particular station , Moriarty gaining more if both get ...
... third payoff would show Holmes and Moriarty both being rewarded if they succeed in getting off at the same station , but Holmes gaining more if both he and Moriarty get off at one particular station , Moriarty gaining more if both get ...
Page 143
... third party without power of decision is scheduled to receive , as a by- product , the payoff in parentheses , Row can win if some means is available for irreversibly surrendering his move to the third player . The payoffs of the latter ...
... third party without power of decision is scheduled to receive , as a by- product , the payoff in parentheses , Row can win if some means is available for irreversibly surrendering his move to the third player . The payoffs of the latter ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game