The Strategy of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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—l vi PREFACE tion with a particular policy problem is in some contrast to the
style of Chapter 4, where it would otherwise belong. The essays are a mixture of “
pure” and “applied” research. To Some extent the two can be separated, as in the
tion theory, theory of evidence, theory of choice, and theory of collective decision.
It is faithful to our definition of “strategy”: it takes conflict for granted, but also
assumes common interest between the adversaries; it assumes a “rational” ...
and what they expect is that they both perceive the same solu- ". tion.15 | In these
terms the first (explicit) part of the Harsanyi hy- || pothesis might be rephrased:
that there is, in any bargaining- || game situation (with perfect information about ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY
Game Theory and Experimental Research
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