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way; and so wee most ignorantly committ a circle. Now wee can have no other notion of things, in themselves, good or evill. And as for moral good or evill, all will confess that any thing may be morally evill, and any [thing morally] good also, and consequently any thing [may be] decent or indecent, morall or immorall. Nay, tho' ther were things evill in them. selvs, (if wee do not apprenbend some other thing in stead of them) wee can have no inclination to them, otherwise the will could wish evill as evill, and if the fancy apprehend any other thing than the evill, it is only the 'ratio sub quâ,' that is appetite [that is if wee desire a real evill, it is under the notion of good].

ters of great consequence, where fancy can not have place; ffor where it can have way, it doth not much concern whither the thing be real in itself or not. Hence it is a principle innate and co-natural to every man to have an insatiable inclination to truth, and to seek for it as for hid treasure, which indeed had its effect upon me, and my reason therin so mastered me, that I was forced of necessity to reject the authoritys and testimonys, both of my parents and others, instilled into me. So that I went further, and examined the point more reasonably, that I might build my faith upon uncontrovertable grounds, and so I proceeded untill that the more I thought theron, the further I was from finding the verity I desired; so that after much ponderings I found my education altogether wrong, not only because it was impossible for me or any that I conversed with, to produce any grounds really sufficient to confirm the same; but with the greatest facility sufficient ground could be produced for the contrair. And this I profess and declare, was the only cause, that made me assert the things, that I asserted, and deny the things that I denyed. And tho' for the most part such persons [scepticks] are stained, and charged with some great and numerous villanys, and immoralitys, which that they may have free liberty to act, without any trouble within or without them, causes them to apostatise or not conform, and to attempt to prove the matter [of religion] vain. But I can charge the world, if they can stain me, or lay any such thing to my charge, so that it was out of a pure love to truth, and my own happiness [that I acted.] And this I proposed to myself, when I was very young, as I remember, about ten years of age, I have been ever, according to my capacity, searching good and sufficient grounds whereon I might safely build my faith, which at first I receaved, gratis dictum; So that after my general doubting, the first thing or head that I fell to work with was, whether or not man was capable of offending Ens entrum, or of any immorality as the thing which must be the basis (next to the existence of God) in such matters. Which after much and serious reasonings, and ponderings, [upon] I concluded [for] the negative. For I thought first, that a great part of morality (if not all) proceeded ex vibitrio hominum,' as that of kingdoms, commonwealths, or what the most part of men think convenient for such and such ends and purposes, which doth only conclude for such ends, and these ends are always terminal upon being 'naturæ congruous. Now wee see, that according to men's fancy, things are congruous or incongruous to their uatures, if not to the body, yet to the thinking faculty. Wee also do not know what is good, or what is evill in itself, if not thus. Whatsoever can be attributed to God, that is good, and what not is evill. And wee know not what can be attributed to God, but [by affirming of him] these things [that] by such a deduction [as I have mentioned,] wee call perfect, and by denying of him, these things wee call imperfect that

But I thought it yet more strange, that even out of the supposition of a natural law, neither by revelation, nor any other way than by the mercy of God, (as we are taught by reason and the light of nature,) would men be pardoned of God, for their immoralitys. For 1st. if God did not pardon men's sins, ther would be no use of his mercies, and certainly if God have mercy (as undoubtedly he has) and if it be infinite, be it must of necessity pardon (as the least of its operations) the greatest sins that the bighest dependent being can be capable of. must not be said, that this overthrows justice, for that is most false, seing that mercy presup poses justice, and the sentence to be given, and then it steps in and satisfies justice. But if you will have these two inconsistent, you must rather say, that God hath not mercy in all things.

And it

But then if mercy do but little help, wee can say that God will not destroy and damn one, that from his heart loves him, prayeth to him, and praiseth him, and doth other acts of natural religion; for thus it would follow that in hell, ther were prayers, praises, and the love of God, and such like, yea and that the creature had more love to the creator, than the creator hath to the creature. All which [consequences] are most absurd. And it is impossible for any intelligent being not to love God, seing that he is with his most appetable attributes,

ipsissimum bonum.' So then it would follow, that men could be saved and enjoy God by the natural law, otherwise the world were almost damned, and even of those who embrace revelation, very few obey it. And [it would follow too], that ther were no need of revelation, or of any other way of salvation, especially such a way as christianisın; for God would not do so great a work without necessity, neither can revelation and providence consist, for if ther be a generall providence, revelation would be but an effect of providence, (and that ordinary) seing that every act of providence, as providence, is alike divine, and so no revelation.

Ther was another great point which I was in doubt of, to witt that of the Trinity, where I thought that the common distinction of a seeming contradiction could not have place; seeing that quicquid est in Deo, est Deus ipse.' I thought nothing more clear than that if "Paternitas filiatio,' and 'Hagio-pneumatos,' be

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included in the essence of God, it would over-principles. And for that end that his everlast throw the simplicity of the same if they being gospeli may flourish in these lands, while really distinct among themselvs, and that sun and moon endureth. And now, O Lord, *paternitas' be not filiatio Hagio-pueumatos," Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in thy hands ĺ and so the Trinity should differ nothing from recommend my spirit, beging and hopeing for the politheism of the Gentiles, by making pardon to all my sins, and to be receaved to three distinct infinits. And many times have thy eternal glory, through the only righteous I pryed as far as my capacity would follow me, merits of Jesus Christ my Saviour. To whom to try that if it were true, how far I could with the Father and Blessed Spirit, my Sanc. reach in the knowledge of such a thing, but I tifyer, be everlasting praise, honour and glory found always that the more I thought [on it] for now and evermore: Amen. the further I was from it.

Sic Subscribitur,

THOMAS AIKENHEAD.

Copy of his LETTER to his freinds from Edinburgh Tolbooth, the day of his death : January 8th, 1697.

Now these things I have puzled and vexed myself in, and all that I could learn therfrom, is, that I cannot have such certainty, either in natural or supernatural things as I would have. And so I desire all men, especially ingenious Being now wearing near the last moment of young men, to beware and take notice of these my time of living in this vain world, I have by things upon which I have splitt. I declare my the enclosed under my own hand,now when I am abhorrence and detest of any of my failings steping into eternity, breifly as my time could or offences concerning the forsaids, and its my only allow, given a true relation to the world. earnest and only desire and prayer to God for in generall, for whose use I am to give some his mercies sake in the name of Jesus Christ, copies of the enclosed at my last end to the (which way I only expect pardon of my sins, ministers and magistrats who shall be by me, and reconciliation with God) to forgive me my and to my dear and worthy freinds (whom I offences and trespasses. As also, I from my from good ground may term parents) in partivery heart and in grief and sorrow therof, am cular, for whose use I will order this enclosed perplexed and troubled for the base, wicked, principall to be delivered by the bearer, to be and irreligious expressions which I have ut- present, of the original rise, matter, and mantered, altho' that I did the same out of a blindner of my doubtings and inquisitions, for which zeal to that which I thought truth. And I pro- as I am now to die, so I desired not to live furfess and declare, that tho' it do not appear much ther than might have contribute to the glory by outward signes and tokens, yet I cannot of God, and good of his people by my after express how much I detest, abhor and am short time (for which I was demanding a re troubled at the same, withall I acknowledge preive) and my own soul's eternal welfare, by and confess to the glory of God, that in all he my more serious and incessant application to hath brought upon me, either one way or other, the throne of mercy for my great sins, which he hath done it most wisely and justly, and II hope shall be all forgiven by the mercy of hope in his mercy that itwill be better for me that he hath afflicted and punished me in this life, and stopt the current of my sins, than that he had suffered me to go on headlong in my own evil ways, into the miserys out of which I should never have recovered. Likeas I bless God I die in the full perswasion of the true Christian Protestant Apostolick faith, according to the tenor of my petitions given into the lords of justiciary and councill, which are signed by me and in their clerks hands.

And I cannot, without doing myself a manifest injury, but vindicat my innocence from those abominable aspersions in a printed satyr of Mr. Mungo Craig's, who was an evidence against me, whom I have to reckon with God and his own conscience, if he was not as deeply concerned in those hellish notions, (for which I am sentenced) as ever I was, however 1 bless the Lord, I forgive him and all men, and wishes the Lord may forgive him likewise.

To conclude, as the Lord in his providence hath been pleasd in this examplary manner to punish my great sins, so it is my earnest desire to him, that my blood may give a stop to that rageing spirit of atheism which hath taken such footing in Brittain, both in practice and profession, And of his infinite mercy recover those who are deluded with these pernicious

God, through the merits of my Redeemer Jesus Christ, tho alace my time hath been short since my sentence, so I have trifled away and mispent too much thereof, however, as my time hath allowed me, the enclosed will give satisfaction to you in particular, and to the world in generall, and after I am gone produce more charity than hath been my fortune to be trysted hitherto with, and remove the apprehensions, which I hear are various with many about my case, being the last words of a dying person, and proceeding from the sincerity of my heart.

Ther is one thing I hear I am aspersed with, which is not in the enclosed, which is, that I am suspected to have practised magick and conversed with devils, which I here declare in the presence of Almighty God, to be algether false and without any solid ground. I desire you may call for extracts of my petitions to the councell and justiciary, which I relate to in my last speech, which I recommend to your care, that I may be vindicated from any false aspersions.

Sic Subscribitur,

THOMAS AIKENHEAD.

Some Animadversions upon Aikenhead's last words, occur in the book, intitled, " Natural Religion insufficient, and Revealed necessary,

to Man's Happiness, in his present state," &c. written by Thomas Hallyburton, a man of learning and of piety, who was Professor of Divinity in the University of St. Andrews, from the year 17 10, to his death in 1712.

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tions, by which they are to be regulated. Those, which are called moral laws, are only the determinations of government, or the cou curring judgment of men, concerning what they think meet to be done for their own ends. That what some judge meet and congruous, others may find unsuitable to their nature and The author, after having set forth the evil ends, and so are not obliged to obey. But, 1. Are of sin, or, as he expresses it, having conde- not all these ungrounded assertions, wherof no scended on a few of those considerations, proof is offered but the author's deluded fancy? whereon he insists for proving sin to be exceed- 2. Has it not been irrefragably demonstrated by ing sinful, proceeds thus: "The Deists, to as many as discourse of moral good and evil, evade the difficulties arising from this evil of that, antecedently to any government among sin, take different courses. Some plainly deny men, we are under a law, the law of nature, any such thing as evil, or that there is any and that this is the will of God. 3. If all thing morally good or bad. Thomas Aiken- these had kept silence, does not the thing itself head, who was executed at Edinburgh, Jan. speak? What can be more evident, than that 8th, 1697, for his blasphemies, in his paper he there is a law of nature, and that this is the delivered from the scaffold, tells us what his law of God. We are certain that we are made thoughts were in this matter, and upon what of rational natures, capable of laws and governgrounds they were built. When in his ra- ment. We are no less sure, that God made us, tional enquiries he came to consider, whether and made us so. It is self-evident, that to him we were capable of offending God, he tells us; who made us, it belongs to govern, and dispose that after much pondering and serious consi- of us to those ends for which we were made. deration he concluded the negative.' The And we by our very beings are bound to obey, famed Mr. Hobbs was not of a very different submit, and subject ourselves to his will and mind: for he plainly asserts, that there is pleasure, who made us, and on whom we every nothing good or evil in itself, nor any common way depend; and therefore his will, if he laws constituting what is naturally just and un- make it known, is a law, and the highest law just: but all things are to be measured by what to us. Again, it is clear that this reason, if we every man judgeth fit, where there is no civil attend to it, tells us, that some things are to be government; and by the laws of society, where done, and some things left undone; such as there is one.' And elsewhere; before men these, that we are to serve, love, obey and hoentered into a state of civil government, there nour him that made us, upholds us, and on was not any thing just or unjust, for as much whom we every way depend; that we are to as just and unjust are the relatives of human carry forward our fellow creatures, as it be Jaws; every action being of itself indifferent." comes those, who have the same original with And whether Spinoza was not of the same us, who are subject to the same rule, are obliged mind, is left to those to judge, who have time to pursue the same ends; and that we are to and leisure to trace his meaning, in his obscure dispose of ourselves, as the author of our naand designedly involved way of writing. But ture allows us. These are all, if not self evisurely this proposition in his Atheistical ethicks dent, yet next to it, and easily deducible from looks very like it, si homines liberi nasce- principles that are so. Further, the reason rentur (liber autem est juxta Spinozam, qui that is implanted in us by God, tells us so; we 'secundum ductum vel ex ducta rationis agit) are to take what it leads us to, while duly used, nullum boni et mali formarent conceptum, as the will of God, and so a law to us. • quamdiu liberi essent.' Mr. Hobbs has been whatever judgement God makes a man with, learnedly confuted by many, such as Dr. Cum-concerning either himself, or other things, berland, Mr. Tyroll, and almost all who write of the law of nature. Spinoza has likewise been examined by Wittichius, and many others. The first, viz. Thomas Aikenhead, his grounds I shall propose and examine.

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The first in his own words runs thus, '1 'thought,' says he, a great part of morality, if not all, proceeded ex arbitrio hominum,' as of that of a kingdom or common-wealth, or what most men think convenient for such ⚫ and such ends, and these ends are always ter'minated upon being congruous to the nature of things; now we see that according to men's fancy things are congruous or incongruous to their natures, if not to the body, yet to the thinking faculty.'

The sum of this confused discourse, which probably he learned from Hobbs, amounts to this: God has fixed no law to our moral ac

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it is God's judgement; and whatever is his judgement, is a law to man; nor can be neg 'lect or oppose it, without sin, being in his 'existence made with a necessary subjection 'to God. Such and such dictates being the 'natural operations of our minds, the being ' and essential constitution of which, in right 6 reasoning, we owe to God, we cannot but esteem them the voice of God within us, and consequently his law to us.' [Sir Charles Wolseley's Scripture Belief, pp. 32, 33.]

What he tells us, of men's different apprehensions about what is right or wrong, makes nothing to the purpose. That only shews, that in many instances we are in the dark as to what is good and evil, which is granted; but will not infer, that there is no fixed measure of good and evil. In many general truths, all, who apply themselves to think, understand the

terms, and have the truths proposed, do agree. And perhaps, all that is knowable of our duty by the light of nature, is deducible from such principles of morality, as all rational men who have them fairly proposed to them, must assent to. And deductions from laws when daly made, are of equal authority with the principles from which they are inferred. And finally, when men, in pursuance of their perverse natures, follow what is cross to those dictates of reason, they are condemned by their own consciences; which shews them under the obligation of a law, and that acting in a congruity to their natures as corrupt is not the standard they are obliged to walk by, since their own reason checks them for doing it. They who would desire to have this matter fully discoursed, may read others who have done it designedly, of whom there is great pienty.

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His second reason runs thus; Also we do 'not know, what is good or evil in itself, if not thus, whatsoever can be attributed to God that is good, and what cannot, is evil. And 'we know not what can be attributed to God, 'but such things as by a deduction we ascribe to him, we call perfect, and such as we deny to be in him, we call imperfect; and so we 'most ignorantly commit a circle. There is no other notion of things in themselves good ' or evil.'

It is much harder to find the sense of these words, if they have any, than to answer the argument. The design of it is to prove, that there is no standard whereby we may judge what is good and what is evil. The force of the argument amounts to this; that there is no way how we come to know any thing to be good, but by this, that it may be ascribed to God. But we cannot know whether it is to be ascribed to God, unless we know that it is perfect or good.

This is thin sophistry, which I might easily expose, were it to any purpose to discover the weakness of that, which it's author was ashamed of and disowned.

As to the first proposition, that there is no other way to know whether any thing be good or evil, but this, that it can or cannot be ascribed to God. 1. The complex proposition is false; for there are other ways whereby we may know things to be good or evil. And this holds, whether we take it in a physical or a moral sense. We know that to be morally good, which God enjoins us to do. We know the will of God in some instances, from the natures God has given us; and from these instances, our reason can infer others. As to physical good, we know things to be good or perfect, by acquaintance with the nature of the things, and by the self-evident notions of perfection: for there are some things, such as dependence, subjection, and the like, which, without any reasoning about the matter, we understand to be imperfect, or perfect; as soon as we understand the terms, and know that a perfection is that, which it is better for

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any being to have than to want; and then what these particular words dependence, subjection, &c. signify. This alone overthrows his whole argument. 2. The maxim which he fixes as a standard; that is good, which may be ascribed to God, and that is not, which may not be ascribed to him, if it is taken in its full extent, it is false as to moral good; of which the only question is: for it is certain, that it is good for man to be a dependent, a subject, &c. which cannot be ascribed to God. If it is taken in a physical sense, it is not to the pur pose: and besides, it would, even in this sense, need some caution.

As to his other proposition, that we cannot otherwise know what is to be ascribed to God, than by knowing that it is good or perfect, it can scarce be supposed to speak of good in a moral sense; and in any other sense it is impertinent. If it is understood in a moral sense, it is likewise false; for we may know that things which are not in their own nature moral perfections, belong to God: such as power, omni-presence, &c. if it be understood in any other sense, we have nothing to do with it.

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The next head that he adds is, "That all 'men will confess that any thing may be mo rally evil and good also, and consequently any thing decent or indecent, moral or immo<ral, Neither though there were things in 'themselves evil (if we do not apprehend 'other things instead of them) can we have any inclination thereunto: otherwise the 'will could wish evil.'

But, 1. Who will grant him (in any other sense, that will be subservient to his purpose) that all actions are indifferent? I know none but men of his own principles. 2. As for what he pretends, that we cannot incline to that which is in its own nature evil, unless it be under the notion of good, I see not what this says for him: it is enough that we can do that action, which is evil and prohibited, yea, and which we know is prohibited, to constitute sin, and make the sinner deeply guilty.

But, not to insist any further on this inconsiderable trifler, (whose undigested notions scarce deserve the consideration we have given them, and much less did they become the awful gravity of the place where they were de livered :) there are others, &c.

Aikenhead's dying Speech appears to have been printed, as Halyburton not only refers to the passage cited above, but also mentions it in bis Index of Authors and books quoted in his

Treatise.

ing case of a convert to Judaism: Wodrow (vol. 2, p. 221,) relates the follow

"Another lamentable effect of the bearing down of the gospel, and the neglect of instructing of people at this time, was the apostacy of too many from the very profession of religion; and indeed profaneness was now at a terrible

height. In the justiciary registers, I find a process against the underwritten person for Judaism, which being the only instance, as far as I know, of this since the Reformation, the curious reader will be content to have a view of it. I give it as it stands in the criminal books, and it is what may be a caution to parents to found their children well in our holy religion, before they suffer them to go abroad.

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profess and openly declare himself to be a Jew, and was circumcised: and having re"turned to Scotland, at Edinburgh, Wrightshouses, Brandsfield, and Hall-heriot, he did 'rail against our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, denying him to be God, and affirming him to be mere man, and a false prophet, and outragiously reviling him by such other bor'rid blasphemies as are not fit to be uttered, renouncing and cursing the holy sacrament and rite of his baptism. And he did with 'great and horrid execrations wish all manner of judgment to befal him, if ever he should return to the Christian religion, in manner at

"Edinburgh, June 15, 1681. Francis Borthwick, second son to James Borthwick ' of Harelaw, being often called to have compeared before the justiciary, this day and place, in the hour of cause, to have underlien the law, for the crime of blasphemy com-length mentioned in the criminal letters, 'mitted by him, in so far as being born of Christian parents, and baptized and educated in the Christian faith, and continuing in the open profession thereof, and communion of the Christian and Catholic church, until the age of 14 years, he went abroad to foreign places, to follow the trade of merchandize, where be was seduced to make a shameful apostacy from the most holy faith, and to

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raised at the instance of his majesty's advocate, and James Cockburn in Duddingstoun informer against him thereanent. And being lawfully cited, and not compearing, the lords adjudged the said Francis Borthwick to be outlaw and fugitive, and all his goods and gear to be brought in for his majesty's use, 'for his contemption and disobedience; which 'was pronounced for doom.'

402. The Trial of EDWARD Earl of WARWICK and HOLLAND, before the House of Lords, for the Murder of Richard Coote, esq. 11 WILLIAM III. A. D. 1699.

March 28, 1699. ABOUT 11 of the clock the Lords came from their own House into the court erected in Westminster-ball, for the Trials of Edward earl of Warwick and Holland, and Charles lord Mohun, in the manner following: The lord high steward's gentlemen attendants, two and two. The clerks of the House of Lords, with two clerks of the crown in the courts of Chancery and King's-bench. The masters in Chancery, two and two. Then the judges. The peers eldest sons, and peers minors, two and two. Four serjeants at arms with their maces, two and two. The yeoman usher of the House. Then the peers two and two, beginning with the youngest barons. Then four serjeants at arms, with their maces. Then one of the heralds, attending in the room of Garter, who by reason of his infirmity could not be present. And the gentleman usher of the Black Rod, carrying the white-staff before the lord high steward. Then the lord chancellor, lord high steward of England, alone.

When the lords were seated on their proper benches, and the lord high steward upon the wool-pack; the two clerks of the crown in the courts of Chancery and King's-bench, standing before the clerk's table with their faces towards the state;

The clerk of the crown in Chancery having his majesty's commission to the lord high steward in his hands, made three reverences towards the lord high steward, and the clerk of

the crown in Chancery ou his knees presented the commission to the lord high steward, who delivered it to the clerk of the crown in the King's-bench, (then likewise kneeling before bis grace) in order to be opened and read; and then the two clerks of the crown making three reverences, went down to the table; and the clerk of the crown in the court of King's-bench commanded the serjeant at arms to make proclamation of silence; which he did in this manner :

Serj. at Arms. O yes, O yes, O yes, My lord high steward his grace does straitly charge and command all manner of persons here present, to keep silence, and hear the king's majesty's commission to his grace my lord high steward of England directed, openly read, upon pain of imprisonment.

spoke to the Peers.
Then the Lord High Steward stood up, and

Lord High Steward. (Lord Somers.) Your lordships will be pleased to stand up, and be uncovered, while the king's commission is reading.

All the Peers stood up, and were uncovered, while the Commission was read.

Clerk of the Crown. Gulielmus Tertius Dei 'Gratia Angl. Scot. Frane. et Hibern. Rex, "Fidei Defensor, &c. Prædilecto et fideli Con'siliar. nostro Johanni Domino Somers, Can'cellar. nostro Angl. Sciatis quod cum Edrus. Comes Warwic. et Holland, nuper de paroch.

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