27. Mr. Spencer holds that the universe is only interpretable in terms of Force, and "Force is unknowable." I have endeavored to show that Force is only interpretable in terms of Feeling, which is essentially knowable, being indeed the source and content of all knowledge. "All other modes of consciousness are derivable from experiences of Force, but experiences of Force are not. derivable from anything else." I should reverse this, and say experiences of Force are the feelings viewed from the objective side. All we know of Force is what is given in Feeling. "Force, as we know it, can be regarded only as a certain conditioned effect of the Unconditioned Cause, as the relative reality indicating to us an Absolute Reality by which it is immediately produced." Unless this means a particular case of a general law, we may ask how it can be known that there is an Unconditioned Cause, and that Force is its conditioned effect?

Mr. Spencer holds that there is an ever-present Reality given in Consciousness, but only known indirectly, and through symbolical representations which are wholly unlike the reals. I hold that this Reality is directly known in its actual relations to Feeling, and indirectly known as a possibility of other relations. The reals known to us are indirectly conceived as parts of a larger whole, and those parts which transcend actual knowledge, together with those which transcend possible knowledge, are the Unknown and the Unknowable Reals; but their postulated existence cannot be allowed to disprove the certainty of the actually felt. Still less can we successfully found a Religion on the admission of this Unknowable; for Religion, which is to explain the universe and regulate life, must be founded on the known and knowable relations.

28. I foresee an objection which some of my readers may raise, namely, Is not the Absolute the unknown quantity of which phenomena are the functions? It is

thus conceivable. But observe, when y is said to be a function of x, and varies with it, we assume a knowledge of the variations of x, although ignorant of its numerical value. That is to say, unless x is akin to y in following the same numerical laws, we cannot operate on it through y. Thus the height of the barometer may be a function of the weight of the atmosphere; the velocity of a falling body may be a function of the distance; the quality of a tone may be a function of the rapidity of the rhythmic air-pulses, etc.; but in each case the effect is the procession of its cause, and the community is proved. Without this community there would be no such relation: the color of the barometer, for instance, is no function of the weight of the atmosphere. If, therefore, there is no community between the Absolute and its phenomena,— the unknown quantity and its functions, we cannot connect them; whereas, if there is this community, we are dealing securely with it in dealing with them.

29. This leads me to another objection. The Absolute, or Thing in itself, is likened to a blow in the dark. We feel a pain, and assign a cause; but not clearly knowing what is the nature of that cause, we say it is "something" outside us. It is thus we assign an unknown cause for the effects of the sensible external. We know the effects, it is argued, but are ignorant of the causes. This objection I hope to have satisfactorily anticipated in showing that effects are the processions of the causes; but it may be answered also from another side. Why do we ascribe the pain to a blow, and the blow to some external agent? Simply owing to the accumulated experiences of similar feelings which have organized this judgment in us. What is immediately given in Consciousness is a change of feeling. The localization of that feeling in a particular part of our body is accompanied by a revival of similar feelings, of which the

known antecedents were the kick of a schoolfellow or the cane of a master. Had these been the only known antecedents of these feelings, the blow in the dark would not have been ascribed to some unknown cause, but to one of these causes. But since similar pains have been experienced under various conditions, we hesitate in ascribing the present feeling to any one, and ascribe it vaguely to "something." This unknown cause is, however, presumably knowable; it is not thought to be an agency unallied with those of previous causes, but an agency similar to those.

"So weit das Ohr, so weit das Auge reicht

Du findest nur Bekanntes, das Ihm gleicht."*

It is this generalization of Cause which is expressed in the term Absolute. Given in every particular experience as the objective factor, it is raised into an abstract conception, and then substantialized. But if this be so, then assuredly we know the Absolute, as all other abstractions are known.

30. Mr. Martineau confesses that inductive science gives no access to "causes behind phenomena." Why then are they postulated? It is because the idea of causality is not to be expelled. If this idea "be a metaphysical datum, it is no wonder that we miss it as a physical quæsitum; nor is it difficult to understand why it presents no variety to our mind, however various the phenomena behind which it is planted, or the corresponding changes of name it may assume. By an irresistible law of thought, all phenomena present themselves to us as the expression of power, and refer us to a ground whence they issue. This dynamic source we neither see, nor hear, nor feel; it is given in thought, supplied by the spontaneous activity of the mind itself as the correlative prefix to the phenomenon observed." I have

* GOETHE.

already traced the genesis of this idea so fully, that I need say nothing more on the point; let me only adduce an illustration. In the various hard substances which we have touched, there has been one quality common to them all, one feeling which has mingled with all the varieties of accompanying feelings; this we detach and call Hardness. This Hardness being an abstraction, no wonder if we miss it as a physical quæsitum; no wonder if it presents no variety to our mind; no wonder if we make it the correlative prefix to the phenomena observed; but are we therefore entitled to say that it is planted behind the phenomena, or that it is anything more than an abstraction from our concrete experiences ?

CHAPTER IV.

MOTION AS A MODE OF FEELING.

31. THE identity of Object and Subject within the sphere of the knowable has gained general acceptance among philosophers, without obliterating the well-marked logical distinction of those two aspects of Existence. The identity of Matter and Force has also gained general acceptance; meanwhile the researches of physiologists have more and more tended to confirm the doctrine that certain neural processes have feelings as concomitants, and that no feeling can arise except under certain conditions of molecular change in the nerve-centres. Nevertheless, the conclusion to which all these lines converge will probably meet with decided and even contemptuous rejection, the conclusion, namely, that Motion is a mode of Feeling.

Nor is this surprising. The love of drawing sharp distinctions, the love of mystery, and the love of stultifying dogmatic confidence by an equally dogmatic scepticism, all unite in proclaiming the gulf between Motion and Feeling to be unbridged, unbridgable. Here, at any rate, Science, it is said, must acknowledge its impotence; however clearly it may trace the course of molecular movements from the excitation of a sensory nerve to its final discharge on a muscle, the transformation of a neural process into a sensation remains an impenetrable mystery. Motion we know, and Feeling we know; but we know them as utterly different; and how the one