ing them to their graves. No man was more ready to bow to authority than he was, but he must know to what extent the principle of defending the West Indies by a military force was to go, before he could judge of its propriety. It was upon this point that he considered himself at issue with the right honourable gentleman at the head of affairs; and he felt himself justified in asserting, that the natural defence of those islands rested in our navy. The situation of France was, in his mind, a material reason why the present establishment was not necessary; for, after her late behaviour in the Dutch dispute, it was not very likely she should wish to commence hostilities against this country. not mortified by the right honourable secretary's noticing his being mistaken in his speculation, made three years since, of the power of France; a change, as sudden as unexpected, had taken place in her affairs, in which some exulted, and of which number, in one point of view, he considered himself as included, from feelings and from principle. To the insinuation which the right honourable secretary had brought against his supposed want of political foresight, he could, without vanity, answer, that there were few mistakes indeed, of which he should be less ashamed; because, even if a person, possessing the gift of prophecy, had appeared in any part of Europe, in Paris or in London, and foretold those extraordinary occurrences which had since arisen, every word issuing from his lips would only have been regarded as a corroboration of his insanity. In three years more, it was possible, she might again have a turn in her affairs, and become more formidable than ever it was not likely, however, that the growth of power should be so sudden, as to prevent our ability of providing against any of its inimical effects. The difference of pulling down and building up, was very material; a state might fall from a pinnacle of power to actual inertness, but to rise to a state of grandeur, on a sudden, was impossible. The right honourable secretary had observed, that it was good to be secure, and not to tempt an attack. Certainly. To this he would reply, that if France were at this moment insecure, and tempting an attack, it arose not from a neglect of her garrisons, or of her large establishments. This country could not bear such immense establishments; the being armed at all points, cap-a-pe, would ultimately prove her ruin: her reliance ought to be on her revenue, and, by a saving from the establishment in the West Indies, she would strengthen herself. He believed it would be difficult for the right honourable gentleman to prove that any of the islands which were lost, could have been saved by the troops now proposed to be sent. He contended, that it was fit the House should, every year, consider the establishment according to the state of the powers of Europe. At present, viewing those powers, he saw no necessity for our keeping up so large an army. The defence of the East Indies, he imagined, would be more advantageously left to the native troops than to Europeans, who could not endure the climate. He observed the army to be continually increasing; that every pretence was seized to increase it, but none to diminish it. The principle upon which the right honourable secretary went for the defence of the West Indies would ultimately prove the present establishment to be too small; and, another year, a further increase might be expected to be proposed: the principle he went upon proved the present establishment to be too great. The House, if it voted the present establishment, without the knowledge of the number of troops meant to defend each island, must give their vote in a blind confidence. Reverting to the subject of France, Mr. Fox described her as in a state which could neither fill us with alarm nor excite us to indignation. Surrounded and oppressed by internal divisions and calamities, she could not so suddenly rise superior to their pressure, as to preclude us from a preparation against an impending storm. Had France remained in that formidable and triumphant state by which she was distinguished in the year 1783, he would be one of the first in the House to applaud an augmentation of our peace-establishment. In all our contests with that ancient enemy, our intemperance had seduced us into very disagreeable situations; and we had been frequently obliged to accept of terms which we might have obtained several years before such an agreement. If fortune had now humbled the pride and ambition of this mighty empire-if that anarchy and confusion incidental to such a revolution had struck her people with inertness and inactivity-why should we dread her sudden declaration of hostilities? But even if she were to merge from her misfortunes as suddenly as she was involved in them, he would recommend the argument of the right honourable secretary as a consolation-"The flourishing state of our finances." If, however, an attention to the West Indies were advanced as a justification of the augmentation, he wished to call to the recollection of gentlemen, that our first surprise did not originate last war in that quarter. It was a wise and happy preamble established by our ancestors in the mutiny bill, that it should assign as a reason for a standing army, the preservation of the political balance of Europe. He lamented, that it was the nature of kings, ministers, generals, and those of a similar description, to oppose the reduction of the army. If a mi nister, the professed friend of mankind, should, however, stand forward in favour of such a measure, he must arm himself with points he must arm himself with resolutions—he must be emboldened to proceed in the reforms. It was a censurable policy to send British troops to the East Indies. He affirmed, that our territories, in that part of the globe should be defended by the natives, who, accustomed to the climate, were more able to endure the fatigues of war. He regretted, that the present administration evinced every pretence for an augmentation of the army, without any for reduction. It was playing with the feelings of the people, to come forward every year, and justify augmentations in the military forces. The fortification-system was chimerical and absurd. They could not vote foolishly away the money of their constituents; they could not vote a blind and abusive confidence in the ministers. He hoped, therefore, that the House would call for an ample explanation of the system so warmly recommended. Nay, as an act of friendship to those gentlemen, he urged them to appear, on such an important occasion, in a free and manly manner, fearless of any consequence, and consulting no dictates, except those of an inflexible integrity. Mr. Burke spoke a considerable time in answer to various arguments which had been insisted upon by Mr. Secretary Grenville and Mr. Pitt, for keeping an increase peace-establishment, and against an improper jealousy of the ministers, in whom a full confidence, subject to responsibility, ought to be placed, on account of their knowledge of the real situation of affairs; the exact state of which, it frequently happened, that they could not disclose, without violating the constitutional and political secrecy, necessary to the well-being of their country. He said, that confidence might become a vice, and jealousy a virtue, according to circumstances. That confidence, of all public virtues, was the most dangerous, and jealousy in an House of Commons, of all public vices, the most tolerable; especially where the number and the charge of standing armies, in time of peace, was the question. That in the annual mutiry-bill, the annual army was declared to be for the purpose of preserving the balance of power in Europe. The propriety of its being larger or smaller depended, therefore, upon the true state of that balance. If the increase of peace-establishments demanded of parliament agreed with the manifest appearance of the balance, confidence in ministers, as to the particulars, would be very proper. If the increase was not at all supported by any such appearance, he thought great jealousy might, and ought to be, entertained on that subject. That he did not find, on a review of all Europe, that, politically, we stood in the smallest degree of danger from any one state or kingdom it contained; nor that any other foreign powers than our own allies were likely to obtain a considerable preponderance in the scale. That France had hitherto been our first object in all considerations concerning the balance of power. The presence or absence of France totally varied every sort of speculation relative to that balance. That France was, at this time, in a political light, to be considered as expunged out of the system of Europe. Whether she ever could appear in it again, as a leading power, was not easy to determine: but at present he considered France as not politically existing; and most assuredly it would take up much time to restore her to her former active existence. ·Gallos quoque in bellis floruisse audivimus, might possibly be the language of the rising generation. He did not mean to deny that it was our duty to keep our eye on that nation, and to regulate our preparation by the symptoms of her recovery. That it was to her strength, not to her form of government, which we were to attend; because republics, as well as monarchies, were susceptible of ambition, jealousy, and anger, the usual causes of But if, while France continued in this swoon, we should go on increasing our expences, we should certainly make ourselves less a match for her, when it became our concern to arm. war. It was said, that as she had speedily fallen, she might speedily rise again. He doubted this. That the fall from an height was with an accelerated velocity; but to lift a weight up to that height again was difficult, and opposed by the laws of physical and political gravitation. In a political view, France was low indeed. She had lost every thing, even to her name. "Jacet ingens littore truncus, Avolsumque humeris caput, et sine nomine corpus.' He was astonished at it-he was alarmed at it-he trembled at the uncertainty of all human greatness. Since the House had been prorogued in the summer, much work was done in France. The French had shewn themselves the ablest architects of ruin that had hitherto existed in the world. In that very short space of time, they had completely pulled down to the ground their monarchy, their church, their nobility, their law, their revenue, their army, their navy, their commerce, their arts, and their manufactures. They had done their business for us as rivals, in a way which twenty Ramilies or Blenheims could never have done it. Were we absolute conquerors, and France to lie prostrate at our *Mr. Burke, probably, had in his mind the remainder of the passage, and was filled with some congenial apprehensions: "Hæc finis Priami fatorum; hic exitus illum "Sorte tulit. Trojam incensam, & prolapsa videntem feet, we should be ashamed to send a commission to settle their affairs, which could impose so hard a law upon the French, and so destructive of all their consequence, as a nation, as that they had imposed upon themselves. France, by the mere circumstance of its vicinity, had been, and in a degree always must be, an object of our vigilance, either with regard to her actual power, or to her influence and example. As to the former, he had spoken; as to the latter, (her example,) he should say a few words: for by this example, our friendship and our intercourse with that nation had once been, and might again become, more dangerous to us than their worst hostility. In the last century, Louis the XIVth had established a greater and better disciplined military force than ever had been before seen in Europe, and with it a perfect despotism. Though that despotism was proudly arrayed in manners, gallantry, splendour, magnificence, and even covered over with the imposing robes of science, literature, and arts, it was, in government, nothing better than a painted and gilded tyranny; in religion, an hard, stern intolerance, the fit companion and auxiliary to the despotic tyranny which prevailed in its government. The same character of despotism insinuated itself into every court of Europe- the same spirit of disproportioned magnificence-the same love of standing armies, above the ability of the people. In particular, our then sovereigns, King Charles and King James, fell in love with the government of their neighbour, so flattering to the pride of kings. A similarity of sentiments brought on connections equally dangerous to the interests and liberties of their country. It were well that the infection had gone no farther than the throne. The admiration of a government, flourishing and successful, unchecked in its operations, and seeming, therefore, to compass its objects more speedily and effectually, gained something upon all ranks of people. The good patriots of that day, however, struggled against it. They sought nothing more anxiously than to break off all communication with France, and to beget a total alienation from its councils and its example; which by the animosity prevalent between the abettors of their religious system and the assertors of ours, was, in some degree, effected. This day the evil is totally changed in France; but there is an evil there. The disease is altered; but the vicinity of the two countries remains, and must remain: and the natural mental habits of mankind are such, that the present distemper of France is far more likely to be contagious than the old one; for it is not quite easy to spread a passion for servitude among the people: but in all evils of the opposite kind, our natural inclinations are flattered. In the case of despotism, there is the fœdum crimen servitutis; in the last the falsa species libertatis; and accordingly, as the historian says, pronis auribus accipitur. In the last age, we were in danger of being entangled by the example of France in the net of a relentless despotism. It is not necessary to say any thing upon that example; it exists no longer. Our present danger from the example of a people, whose character knows no medium, is, with regard to government, a danger |