fact moulded and modified by Philo's speculations on the Logos, if not directly derived from them. To this De Wette assents, in his Exegetical Manual. These critics profess, indeed, not to be wholly satisfied that John drew directly from this source; but they think that at all events he must have been acquainted with Philo's speculations, and influenced by them.

The same thing has often been asserted before, and many have labored to establish the probability of the assertion. The numerous resemblances that are found in Philo, between his Logos and that of John, are the main sources of argument to which all these critics resort. Some of these resemblances, at first view, appear to be very striking. But a careful examination and comparison of the whole, leads to a conclusion very different from that which a hasty or a superficial reader might make. Dorner has recently made such an examination. He has shown, as it seems to me every unprejudiced reader must now acknowledge, that the Logos of Philo is not a hypostasis; that nothing was farther from Philo's mind than the union of God and man in one person; that he had no belief in the need of any special atoning mediator like Christ, and no expectation of a Messiah like him who is described by John. "But," to use the words of Dorner, "blinding as the resemblance between many of his ideas and modes of expression and those of Christianity may be to the superficial reader, yet the essential principle of the two is to its very foundation diverse. Even that which sounds like [the expressions of John] has, in its entire connection, a meaning altogether diverse. . . . His system stalks by the cradle of Christianity only as a spectral counterpart. It appears like the floating, dissolving Fata Morgana, on the horizon where Christianity is about to arise." (I. s. 56.)

...

Such is the conclusion of the ablest writer, who has yet treated of the matter before us. It would detain me too long were I to produce, in this place, the views of Philo and the reasoning of Dorner respecting them. My intention however is, considering the importance of the subject, to exhibit them in the way of appendix, at the close of the present examination.

I must add a few general remarks, before quitting the subject of the various productions which I have already brought to view, on the efforts that have been made to show that John drew his views of the Logos from them.

Every one who is acquainted with the prejudices of the Palestine. Jews against the foreign and the Grecian literature, during the apostolic age, will be slow to believe, that a fisherman from the lake of Galilee was conversant with the philosophy of Philo, or even that of

the apocryphal books of the Old Testament. John might indeed, while at Ephesus, have formed an acquaintance with the writings of the Egyptian Hebrews. But were they in any repute at that time, or regarded at all as authority, among the Palestine Jews? The Sept. version of the O. Test. might be, and seems to have been, favorably regarded, by all the Jews acquainted with Greek. But the reason of this is plain. It was still the O. Test., although its costume was changed. But that Philo, or the apocryphal writers, were sources to which a genuine Hebrew would resort, in order to obtain his religious views, is a thing of which the N. Test. affords no good and certain evidence. John could not expect to commend his gospel to his countrymen in this way. The evidence, then, that he drew from such a source, ought to be very strong, in order to justify us in giving credit to it.

One more general remark, and I shall pass on to the sequel of the verse before us. This is, that when so many resemblances of the copía of Philo and of the Apocrypha to the Logos of John are produced, we must consider the obvious coincidence of these two words, in a variety of respects. In speaking of oogía, a writer like Philo, or .Jesus Sirach, or even like the author of the book of Proverbs, might naturally say very much like that which John has said of the Logos; for all of the first named writers personify the wisdom of the Godhead, and in this way of course they say much that may be appropriately predicated of the Logos as represented by John. The former extend the idea of wisdom to all the manifestations of the Godhead. They represent it as a creative, life-giving, governing, enlightening, sanctifying power. John has predicated the same things of the Logos. Hence the apparent similarity. But the discrepancy, after all, is striking and fundamental. They evidently, for the most part, merely personify, or, when they go beyond this (if indeed they do), they employ the word wisdom as a mere periphrasis for God himself; just as we use Omnipotence or Omniscience to designate him who possesses these attributes. But with John, Logos is not an attribute. It is a hypostasis in some respects diverse from God, while still it is God. Withal, it "became flesh and dwelt among us." This last circumstance, in a most special manner, widely distinguishes the Logos of John from the copía of the other writers. Plainly, therefore, when the whole development in both cases is taken into view, and the nature of the subject in each is duly considered, the resemblances in some respects do not prove the derivation of John's views from those of the former writers, inasmuch as the discrepancies are so wide and so palpable as to preclude any supposition of such a nature. Indeed I cannot resist the impression, that John purposely chose the word 2óyos, in preference

to Gogía, in order that he might avoid representing a divine attribute as becoming incarnate, and also avoid being confounded with the other writers who had treated of wisdom.

Ilgos tòv Oɛóv—with God. So our version, and so the nature of the case obliges us to translate. The more usual meaning of zoos with the Acc., is towards, to, unto. But the sense of the passage here would be marred, and indeed unintelligible, if we should so translate it. Пgós has a multiplicity of meanings, and may stand before the Gen., Dat. or Accusative. In all these cases, it designates, among other things, space-relations; and with either of the cases noós may denote proximity, nearness. That the idea which we express by at, with, near by, close to, is sometimes designated by noós with the Acc., both in the classics and in the N. Test., is plain from abundance of examples; see Mark 6: 3, noòs nuas, with us; Matt. 13: 56 id. Mark 9: 19, gos vuus, with you; Matt. 26: 55. 1 Cor. 16: 6, 7. Gal. 1: 18. 4: 18. Mark 2: 2. In such cases ¬gós is equivalent to naoά with the Dat., as Winer has abundantly shown in his Grammar, and as any good lexicon will demonstrate. Indeed John himself has decided this by his παρὰ σεαυτῷ and παρὰ σοί in 17: 5, where the very same connection of the Son with the Father is expressed as here, viz. one that preceded the creation of the world. The same idea is also expressed (in 1: 18) by the phrase, Who is in (or on, eis) the bosom of the Father. Nearness, intimate communion or the most intimate union, of the lóyos with God, seems plainly to be the idea aimed at by ngòs ròv đɛóv. Still it differs from what would be expressed by iv 79 989. The latter would carry with it the idea that the lóros was (so to speak) a part or portion of the Godhead, as an attribute, etc., if metaphysically considered; or if morally understood, it would designate a moral union, harmony, or agreement. Iloos zòv Osor expresses neither of these ideas, but designates an ontological connection and communion, with the implication, moreover, that in some respect or other there is a diversity. We should not think of saying, with any intelligible meaning, that God is with himself, when simply and absolutely considered. To say, then, that the Logos is with him, must mean, that there is a diversity of some kind between the Logos and God; although the writer has not undertaken to define in what that diversity consists. I have named the connection ontological, because it is evidently of a nature different from that which is designated in such passages as assert the moral union of God and Christ and believers; e. g. John 17: 21-23, comp. vs. 10, 11.

But, after all, the inquiry remains: What is the exact idea which John means to designate? The word noós designates, in its primary

At the outset of this

and literal sense, a space-relation, viz. the proximity of one thing to another. It may also have a kindred secondary and tropical sense; in which case it means in respect to, as to, in reference to, according to, on account of, and the like. But plainly none of these or the like tropical senses fit the passage before us. We must return, then, to the ontological view, and ask: What in this respect does noós mean? inquiry, some things appear to be plain and certain. An actual literal space-relation is out of the question, as has already been hinted, for the Logos and God are spiritual beings, yea purely spiritual. Now space-relations can belong only to material things, and cannot be literally transferred to spiritual ones. Logos was literally near to or with God, would therefore convey intelligible and rational meaning. It would imply that both God and the Logos are of limited extension; an idea incompatible with the omnipresence of both. John could not have meant to teach such a doctrine; for his views of the Godhead are evidently and palpably of the most spiritual kind. Something different from this he surely designed to express. But what this was, can be discovered, if indeed it is capable of being developed, only by an accurate and careful survey of the nature of language, when applied to beings spiritual and divine. To do this effectually, we must glance at some of the fundamental principles that belong to the nature of language, and to its application to the Godhead.

To say that the

no

(1) All language is the expression of thought and feeling. Beyond this circle it cannot go, and yet retain any definite meaning. Whatever it originally expresses, must be ideas within the circle of sensation, reflection, or consciousness, for in one or other of these ways we obtain all our ideas.

(2) No nation or people coin words beyond their necessity. They have no store-house where they are laid up. The power of coining is all they need; and this they possess. Hence it is, that in neither Hebrew, Greek, or Latin, can we find any words appropriate to express ideas or things, beyond the circle of knowledge among the nations who spoke these languages. For example, nearly all the modern technics of the arts and sciences, also all such words as designate objects that were unknown to them, whether they have relation to government, manners, customs, manufactures and instruments of various kinds, or to plants, trees, minerals, animals, and the like-all such words, which now make up one half of our language, are entirely wanting in the ancient languages. It is easy to illustrate this, by a moment's delay. Let us choose, as an example, things now connected with the art of carrying on war by land and by sea, a matter so well known and so often practised by the ancients. How would any one translate into Hebrew or Greek,

words expressive of the common implements of war at the present day? Let him be called on to translate gunpowder, gun, rifle, swivel, bomb, cannon, Congreve rocket, and many other instruments of destruction; can he do it? Or if we transfer the scene of contest to the waters of the ocean, we may then ask him to translate this (to us very intelligible) sentence: "The brig was hulled by a broad-side from a frigate, and blown up by a Congreve rocket from a man of war." What is the reason, now, that in not one of the cases in question, or in a multitude more of the like tenor, not a single portion of this sentence can be expressed in Hebrew or Greek, in a manner like that in which we express ourselves, or even at all, except by diffuse and inadequate circumlocution? The reason, I answer, is plain enough. All these and the like objects were never within the circle of Greek or Hebrew cognition, and of course they have no names in the respective languages. This exemplifies the position, that no store-house of words was furnished in ancient times for future use, and sufficiently illustrates our assertion, that the coining of words is limited by the need of them.

Let us pause here, for a moment, and reverse the case. The Hebrews and Greeks were cognizant of many objects natural and artificial, which are entirely out of the circle of our acquaintance, and for which we have no names. How then can we translate many things named in the Scriptures of both Testaments? We cannot do it with any exactness. We must either transfer the words of the original, and explain as we best may, or we must employ a diluted and feeble circumlocution.

(3) We have seen that no people form words to designate things out of the circle of their cognition. So long then as the invisible world is known to them neither by experience nor intuition, men do not form words intended specifically to designate the objects of that world. But before a revelation, the true spiritual nature of God, and of heavenly beings, was wholly unknown to men. An imaginary future, and imaginary gods, the heathen nations indeed thought and spoke much of. But all they said and thought, in regard to these, is deeply tinged with their supposed resemblance to material and earthly objects. Their gods are of course full of human passions and infirmities. Their heaven and hell are but copies of terrestrial scenes of happiness or of misery. They were unable to go beyond this, in their conceptions or their expressions. And it was by men of such a cast, that the Hebrew and Greek languages were moulded. Joshua tells us that the ancestors of Abraham" served other gods," 24: 2; and we know what was the state of the Greeks. When prophets and apostles, then, were called to deliver inspired messages, they were compelled to employ languages