clearly he may accept it, with no taint of selfish motive, for a selfish act is one where the supposed interests of the actor are alone considered; but in the supposed case the entirety of human welfare is taken into view, and the act which benefits the doer is performed only because it accords with true human welfare. It would be a wretched blunder to imagine that no one may do anything to benefit himself without incurring the charge of greed. He is bound to do all that may benefit himself, provided that thus he forward, or at least do not hinder, the common welfare.

Our conclusion, then, is clear, that acts of competition may be rightly performed, namely, if the actor believe that such acts truly promote human welfare.

Still, it will be urged, better knowledge would show the error, the intellectual though not moral error, of the position that competition is beneficial. It may be conceded, such persons will continue, that people exist who cherish these beliefs; economists, for instance, are emphatic concerning the merits of the system-it stimulates industry

and invention, checks exorbitant prices, and so forth; but they will, with better knowledge, desert that doctrine, and the result must therefore be that, finally, competition will only be practised on the ground of selfishness. It is really against the general interest, and the deception will soon vanish, carrying with it its only moral defence, and the blundering unselfishness will be replaced by clear-headed greediness if the system last.

If that system is to be regarded as one and homogeneous, and better knowledge is to show its harmfulness, the contention is true. But here are two important assumptions, on which the whole question hangs. As at present practised, competition is undoubtedly the source of large evils, and so is given a plausibility to the general condemnation of those who obey it ; but is exchange one and homogeneous in the sense which is important here? Do all acts of exchange give an unjust result, or do some give fairness and equality? If, now, exchange is in some instances just and in others unjust, the system loses the oneness claimed, and the

admitted evils which result from it may form no charge against Mr. A. or Mr. B., for he may, so far as can be judged, have only availed himself of competition so far as it enabled him to buy or sell at just prices. We cannot, then, say that when the true basis of competition is better understood no moral person will sanction it, for if some prices so reached may be unfair, others may be just; and it is this result which renders the transaction ethically good or bad, as we have already seen.

The same consideration, namely, that the terms of the exchange fix its character, and not the mere fact that those terms are fixed by competition, enables us to deal with the second assumption, that better knowledge will show to the ignorant the harmfulness of all such exchange. Undoubtedly great evils result from what is loosely termed competition; but if such exchange is not necessarily wrong in itself, and this position has been already laid down, we may permit ourselves to consider the various kinds of exchange which are grouped under the term competitive; and we may perhaps discover

that it is not competition, pure and simple, which is the source of the evils which exist, but competition plus other conditions, each of which is by no means a necessary attendant. The conditions or forces may aggregate themselves round this exchange with a result that is fair, but round that one and the consequence is deplorable.

The question, then, that issues is this: Is it practicable, while adhering to competition, to produce a just result? If so, the prospect of progress seems brighter, for we avail ourselves of the commercial system now established, to uproot which would be a task that might well stagger a French revolutionist, though Mr. Ruskin does not appear to despair.

The first step in this inquiry is to ascertain whether the tendency of competition is towards a just or an unjust result. Apart from the exceptional circumstances which may place this man at an advantage and his fellow at a disadvantage, and assuming men to meet on terms of perfect equality, on what terms will they exchange if they act purely from self-interest?

By self-interest, let us understand the narrow self-interest which simply seeks to gain as much as possible in exchange for the least possible. The answer which the present writer affirms to be true is that, in such circumstances, competition will give precise equality in exchange; in other words, the desideratum of a "just price." It is not meant that competition can in actual life be such that perfect justice will be attained. Perfection does not belong to this world; we have to be satisfied with a tolerable approach thereto. What is meant is that the unjust results are due to elements in competitive exchange which are not necessarily there—which are limitations of free exchange; and that perfectly free exchange by competition would give a perfectly just result.

Let us endeavour to conceive of such a case, and, to preserve simplicity in our illustration, we will instance half a dozen men who produce goods which they barter among themselves. A shall be a baker, B a butcher, C a tailor, D a shoemaker. A can produce six loaves, B six pounds of meat, C a waistcoat, and D a pair