'faith' may mean either a belief in certain propositions, or confidence, trust, and repose in a certain person; the word 'church' may mean the whole body of Christians (and, of course, in this sense its signification will vary according to the meaning attached to the term Christian), a particular section of Christians, a congregation meeting in a certain place, the place of meeting, and, lastly, by a strange perversion of the term, the clergy as distinguished from the laity; the term 'loyalty' may mean either attachment to the laws of a country in general, special attachment to some particular portion of the laws, or, in its most restricted sense, personal attachment to the supreme ruler; 'capital' may mean either the amount of money possessed by a trader, or his whole stock of commodities available for future production; 'natural' may express either the original condition of a thing, or the state into which it is ultimately developed, besides having countless other meanings. On account of the various significations which may be attached to the same term, it is necessary, in entering on any investigation, carefully to define the terms to be employed, and never, without express notice, to deviate from the sense thus imposed upon them. CHAPTER IX. On Method as applied to the arrangement of Syllogisms in a Train of Reasoning. We do not propose to treat of Method in general (for this would involve a discussion of induction and the various relations in which it stands to deductive inference), but it may be useful to the student if we offer a few remarks on Method under the limitation stated in the heading of this chapter. When syllogisms are combined in a train of reasoning, we may either commence with the conclusion, and ask what reasons we have for believing it, and then go on to ask the reasons for believing the premisses, and so on, till at last we arrive at some propositions of which there is no doubt, or in which we at least can acquiesce; or else we may follow the reverse process, and commencing with propositions which are the result of some previous investigation, or which we at all events accept as true, may go on combining them with each other, till at last we arrive at some conclusion which we regard as sufficiently important to terminate our enquiries. The former method will be familiar to our readers as that by which we solve what are called 'geometrical deductions,' and in fact as the method which we generally though not universally employ when we are attempting to resolve difficulties for ourselves; the latter as the method by which the propositions in Euclid are proved, and in fact as the method which we generally though not universally employ, when it is our object to teach others, either orally or by book. Now the former method is called Analytical (from the Greek word dváλvois), because it may be regarded as the breaking up of a whole into its parts, the resolution of the final conclusion of a series of syllogisms into the various premisses on which it depends, and of which it is, as it were, the total expression. The latter method is called Synthetical (from the Greek word σúveσis), because it may be regarded as the putting together of the parts into a whole, the combination of the various premisses into a conclusion which is, as it were, their total result. The Synthetical Method is also sometimes called Progressive, and the Analytical Method Regressive, for reasons which will be apparent from what has already been said, The words a priori and a posteriori may also be used to express the same distinction. In inductive inference (to which these terms are more properly applied) we are said to proceed a posteriori, when, a certain event having taken place, we attempt to trace the steps by which it came about, or, a certain phenomenon being presented to us for examination, we attempt to infer the mode of its production; and, vice versâ, we are said to proceed a priori, when, from our knowledge of certain circumstances, we attempt to predict an event, or, by putting in opera OF SYLLOGISMS IN A TRAIN OF REASONING. 149 tion certain causes, we attempt to discover their effect. Similarly, in deductive inference, if, a conclusion being assumed as provisionally true, we attempt to discover reasons for it, we may be said to proceed a posteriori; if, starting with the premisses, we go on combining them to see whither they will lead us, we may be said to proceed a priori. In the former method of reasoning, we are peculiarly liable to impose on ourselves or others by availing ourselves of premisses which are fanciful, obscure, incapable of proof, questionable, or untrue, especially if the conclusion express some cherished conviction or some position which it is the interest of ourselves, our class, or our party to accept and to disseminate. Whenever, therefore, we argue from our conclusions backwards, especial caution is required, if it be our sincere desire to test our convictions impartially. Note. For an account of the various senses in which the words analysis' and 'synthesis' are or have been employed the student is referred to Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxiv, and Mr. Mansel's Edition of Aldrich, Appendix G. |