Note 2.- -The term 'attributive' (which has already been employed by Harris and James Mill) is used in preference to the term 'adjective,' both because it includes participles, and because it seems undesirable to employ in a work on Logic an ordinary term of Grammar. Harris (Hermes, bk. i. ch. vi.) includes amongst ' attributives' verbs; but a verb, as has already been stated, is, in Logic, always represented by the copula and a participle.

We have placed attributives before abstract terms, because they are more nearly allied to singular, collective, and common terms, being, for the most part, either predicated of these terms or employed to qualify them. They seem also as a rule to precede abstract terms in their formation. Thus human, red, brave, good, willing, must have been employed before the corresponding terms humanity, redness, bravery, goodness, willingness.

Note 3.-For the sake of completeness, we have spoken of a term as expressing an attribute or a group of attributes. There is however no distinct name for a term expressing a single attribute incapable of analysis, and the only peculiarity of such terms is, as will be seen below, that they are incapable of definition. Locke called attributes which were incapable of analysis simple ideas,' but the expression 'simple term' would not be applicable in a corresponding sense.

Note 4.-That common terms, attributives, and abstract terms are formed from a comparison of individual objects or groups of objects, and that consequently they

are results of thought, is obvious. But it may not be so easy to perceive that this is the case with singular and collective terms. These terms however are appropriated to individual objects or groups of objects, in order to distinguish them from others, and the necessity for such distinction can only arise after a comparison of this or that individual or group with others, and a perception of certain points of resemblance and difference between them. Unless I had observed some difference between John and Thomas, this table and that, the thirteenth legion and the fourteenth, it would never have occurred to me to distinguish them by separate names; but this very observation of a difference involves an act of comparison, and consequently an act of thought.

Note 5.-It is important to notice that in a series of terms, like man, human, humanity, all expressing the same attributes, the later and more abstract terms can hardly fail to suggest the earlier and more concrete, and it is so because the earlier terms of the series have been longer formed and are therefore, as a rule, more familiar to us. Thus 'humanity' can hardly fail to suggest to us the word 'human,' from which it is formed, and 'human' will suggest the word 'man,' from the Latin equivalent of which it is also formed, and whose attributes it expresses. Nor can we use the word 'man' without thinking of this or that individual man with whom we are familiar. A common term, in fact, expresses simply an individual object divested of all its peculiar attributes, and regarded

as possessing only those attributes which it has in common with all the other objects which are designated by the same name. But it is indifferent on which object of the group the mind concentrates its attention, and we are all along conscious that the particular object selected is simply representative of the group. And hence it is that a common name simultaneously suggests to the mind a group of individual objects and a bundle of attributes characteristic of that group. For a further discussion of this subject, see Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. xxxv. and xxxvi.; Mansel's Prolegomena Logica, ch. i.; and Mill's Examination of Hamilton, ch. xvii.

Note 6.-Mr. Mill maintains that attributives, when employed as predicates, are really common terms. Thus the propositions 'All triangles are three-sided,' 'All wise men are just,' are regarded by him as only abbreviated modes of saying 'All triangles are three-sided figures,' 'All wise men are just men.' We should allow that the attributive in the predicate, when taken in conjunction with the subject, always suggests a common term which may be substituted for it, as in the syllogism 'All wise men are virtuous, All virtuous men are happy; .. All wise men are happy.' But, though the attributive may always admit of being expressed as a common term, while it continues to be expressed as an attributive there seem to be present to the mind only attributes, whereas, when it becomes a common term, there seems also to be present a group of individuals possessing those attributes.

CHAPTER II.

On the Denotation and Connotation of
Terms.

A TERM is said to denote individuals or groups of individuals, to connote attributes or groups of attributes.

In the first place, a term may serve to denote or point out an individual object or group of individuals. Thus Socrates' denotes or points out and distinguishes from all others the individual man Socrates. The expression tenth legion' denotes or points out, and distinguishes from all other collections of men, the particular group known as the tenth legion. Similarly, the word 'man' denotes or points out, and distinguishes from all other groups, a certain group of individuals to each member of which and to each member of which only the word 'man' may legitimately be applied. All terms of this kind, therefore, viz. singular, collective, and common terms, are denotative; but terms like human, white, humanity, whiteness, i. e. attributives and abstract terms, are not denotative, except mediately, that is, so far as they suggest the common terms 'human beings,' 'white things.'

In the second place, a term may serve to connote attributes or groups of attributes. Thus terms like humanity, human, man, viz. abstract, attributive, and common terms, are all connotative, that is, they at once suggest or imply attributes. But singular and collective terms like Socrates,' 'the tenth legion,' are not connotative, except so far as they suggest common terms. This requires some explanation. A collective term like 'the tenth legion,' 'the House of Commons,' at once suggests the corresponding common term, 'soldiers of the tenth legion,' or 'members of the House of Commons; and this common term may connote any number of attributes, but, as the attributes are suggested mediately through the common term and not directly by the collective term, the collective term is, strictly speaking, non-connotative. The same is the case with a singular term. A term like 'William' may suggest to me 'man,' 'male,' 'Englishman,' 'one of my friends,' &c., and so may become connotative, but it is in itself rightly regarded as non-connotative, inasmuch as it suggests to me these attributes only through the medium of the common terms to which it is referred.

It appears therefore that common terms are both denotative and connotative; that singular and collective terms are denotative, but not connotative; that abstract terms and attributives are connotative, but not denotative; and finally, that mediately, as suggesting common terms, any non-connotative term may become connotative and any non-denotative term denotative.