The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
From inside the book
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Page 34
... adversary skeptical of any new pretense at commitment . One , therefore , needs an " excuse " for accommodating his opponent , preferably a rationalized reinterpretation of the original commitment , one that is persuasive to the adversary ...
... adversary skeptical of any new pretense at commitment . One , therefore , needs an " excuse " for accommodating his opponent , preferably a rationalized reinterpretation of the original commitment , one that is persuasive to the adversary ...
Page 175
... adversary's gaining intelligence about one's own mode of play - to prevent his deductive antici- pation of how one may make up one's own mind , and to protect oneself from tell - tale regularities of behavior that an adversary might ...
... adversary's gaining intelligence about one's own mode of play - to prevent his deductive antici- pation of how one may make up one's own mind , and to protect oneself from tell - tale regularities of behavior that an adversary might ...
Page 200
... adversary with him . " Brinkmanship is thus the deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war , a risk that one does not completely control . It is the tactic of deliberately letting the situation get somewhat out of hand , just ...
... adversary with him . " Brinkmanship is thus the deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war , a risk that one does not completely control . It is the tactic of deliberately letting the situation get somewhat out of hand , just ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game