The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 75
... agreement but a better understanding of where to look for the terms of agreement . If there are important conclusions to be drawn , they are prob- ably these : ( 1 ) tacit agreements or agreements arrived at through partial or haphazard ...
... agreement but a better understanding of where to look for the terms of agreement . If there are important conclusions to be drawn , they are prob- ably these : ( 1 ) tacit agreements or agreements arrived at through partial or haphazard ...
Page 269
... agreement exists , the players receive nothing . Next , what do we mean by " agreement " ? For simplicity , sup- pose that each player keeps ( or may keep ) his current " official " offer recorded in some manner that will be visible to ...
... agreement exists , the players receive nothing . Next , what do we mean by " agreement " ? For simplicity , sup- pose that each player keeps ( or may keep ) his current " official " offer recorded in some manner that will be visible to ...
Page 273
... agreement must specify precisely which individual items go to which individual players . If the rules re- quire that full and exhaustive agreement be reached , then in the tacit game the players are dependent on their ability not only ...
... agreement must specify precisely which individual items go to which individual players . If the rules re- quire that full and exhaustive agreement be reached , then in the tacit game the players are dependent on their ability not only ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game