## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

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Page 75

If there are important conclusions to be drawn , they are probably these : ( 1 ) tacit

agreements or agreements arrived at through partial or haphazard negotiation

require terms that are qualitatively distinguishable from the

If there are important conclusions to be drawn , they are probably these : ( 1 ) tacit

agreements or agreements arrived at through partial or haphazard negotiation

require terms that are qualitatively distinguishable from the

**alternatives**and ...Page 109

Give the game enough " topical content " to provide some room for argument ,

casuistry ,

mathematical range with a conspicuous mid - point . Now have the two players ...

Give the game enough " topical content " to provide some room for argument ,

casuistry ,

**alternative**rationales , and so forth ; that is , provide more than a baremathematical range with a conspicuous mid - point . Now have the two players ...

Page 275

lyze this game in more detail , considering such things as

terminating the game or of defining “ agreement , " and so forth . It seems more

worthwhile , however , to raise at this point the question of whether the perfectly ...

lyze this game in more detail , considering such things as

**alternative**ways ofterminating the game or of defining “ agreement , " and so forth . It seems more

worthwhile , however , to raise at this point the question of whether the perfectly ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield