Results 1-3 of 56
the first , fearing the second ' s attack , may try to strike first to forestall it . Thus it
does seem as though we might get a compounding of motives . But we do not .
We do not get any regular kind of “ multiplier " effect out of this . The probabilities
Suppose R is given a free choice , to attack or not , while C is constrained to wait ;
and C can attack only after R has had an opportunity to make his choice and act
on it , and only if R has not attacked . We now build further on this game , by ...
attack before " retaliating " is to require more evidence that they are really
seagulls for holding back our own planes . But now we can have a model of a
rational decider who responds to an estimate of the probability of being attacked
not by an ...
What people are saying - Write a review
LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
Bargaining Communication and Limited
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
Enforcement Communication and Strategic
9 other sections not shown