## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 56

Page 212

the first , fearing the second ' s

does seem as though we might get a compounding of motives . But we do not .

We do not get any regular kind of “ multiplier " effect out of this . The probabilities

of ...

the first , fearing the second ' s

**attack**, may try to strike first to forestall it . Thus itdoes seem as though we might get a compounding of motives . But we do not .

We do not get any regular kind of “ multiplier " effect out of this . The probabilities

of ...

Page 217

Suppose R is given a free choice , to

and C can

on it , and only if R has not

Suppose R is given a free choice , to

**attack**or not , while C is constrained to wait ;and C can

**attack**only after R has had an opportunity to make his choice and acton it , and only if R has not

**attacked**. We now build further on this game , by ...Page 221

seagulls for holding back our own planes . But now we can have a model of a

rational decider who responds to an estimate of the probability of being

not by an ...

**attack**before " retaliating " is to require more evidence that they are reallyseagulls for holding back our own planes . But now we can have a model of a

rational decider who responds to an estimate of the probability of being

**attacked**not by an ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield