## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

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Page 267

The second part of the paper argues that symmetry in the solution of

nonzero - sum game — a

the ...

The second part of the paper argues that symmetry in the solution of

**bargaining****games**cannot be supported on the notion of ... A nontacit ( “ cooperative ” )nonzero - sum game — a

**bargaining game**— is not defined by its payoff matrix ;the ...

Page 271

perfectly move - symmetrical

at some definite penultimate moment , to a tacit ( noncooperative )

...

perfectly move - symmetrical

**bargaining game**. It is that it necessarily gives way ,at some definite penultimate moment , to a tacit ( noncooperative )

**bargaining****game**. And each player knows this . The most informative way to characterize the...

Page 288

I conjecture that , in the frame of mind I have asked for — a frame of mind that

made the Nash point appeal to us in the explicit -

probably pick the Nash point . Without asking precisely why , let us go on to

another ...

I conjecture that , in the frame of mind I have asked for — a frame of mind that

made the Nash point appeal to us in the explicit -

**bargaining game**— we shouldprobably pick the Nash point . Without asking precisely why , let us go on to

another ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield