## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 56

Page 3

Among the latter there is a further division between those that examine the

participants in a conflict in all their complexity — with regard to both " rational "

and " irrational ”

well as to ...

Among the latter there is a further division between those that examine the

participants in a conflict in all their complexity — with regard to both " rational "

and " irrational ”

**behavior**, conscious and unconscious , and to motivations aswell as to ...

Page 4

We may wish to control or influence the

want , therefore , to know how the variables that are subject to our control can

affect their

seriously ...

We may wish to control or influence the

**behavior**of others in conflict , and wewant , therefore , to know how the variables that are subject to our control can

affect their

**behavior**. If we confine our study to the theory of strategy , weseriously ...

Page 225

Actually , stability of the matrix game , as distinct from stability of a parametric -

hypothesis ; to contemplate the matrix and to anticipate the other ' s action is to

project ...

Actually , stability of the matrix game , as distinct from stability of a parametric -

**behavior**equilibrium , is not a relevant concept for the parametric -**behavior**hypothesis ; to contemplate the matrix and to anticipate the other ' s action is to

project ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield