The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 59
... better than if he had had to argue it out with the other . This last case illustrates that it may be to the advantage of one to be unable to communicate . There is room here for a motive to destroy communication or to refuse to ...
... better than if he had had to argue it out with the other . This last case illustrates that it may be to the advantage of one to be unable to communicate . There is room here for a motive to destroy communication or to refuse to ...
Page 186
... better with a mixed commitment . He can , because he and Column are both attracted to column I , disagreeing only over the choice of Row in that column . If he offers Column a 50-50 chance between rows i and ii , Column gets an expected ...
... better with a mixed commitment . He can , because he and Column are both attracted to column I , disagreeing only over the choice of Row in that column . If he offers Column a 50-50 chance between rows i and ii , Column gets an expected ...
Page 298
... better than ( i , I ) ; since we need an excuse , if not a reason , for pretending , if not be- lieving , that one of the equilibrium pairs is better , or more dis- tinguished , or more prominent , or more eligible , than the other ...
... better than ( i , I ) ; since we need an excuse , if not a reason , for pretending , if not be- lieving , that one of the equilibrium pairs is better , or more dis- tinguished , or more prominent , or more eligible , than the other ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game