## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

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Page 164

But , if they can , they can do something that no purely formal game theory can

take into account ; they can do

predict . And , if they can do

But , if they can , they can do something that no purely formal game theory can

take into account ; they can do

**better**than a purely deductive game theory wouldpredict . And , if they can do

**better**— if they can rise above the limitations of a ...Page 186

He can , however , do slightly

he and Column are both attracted to column I , disagreeing only over the choice

of Row in that column . If he offers Column a 50 - 50 chance between rows i and ...

He can , however , do slightly

**better**with a mixed commitment . He can , becausehe and Column are both attracted to column I , disagreeing only over the choice

of Row in that column . If he offers Column a 50 - 50 chance between rows i and ...

Page 214

12 R still has a “ dominant strategy ” of attack ; he does

matter what C does . But in this case , as distinct from the case portrayed in Fig .

19 , he is worse off than if neither side had elected to attack . It is C ' s knowledge

of ...

12 R still has a “ dominant strategy ” of attack ; he does

**better**by attacking , nomatter what C does . But in this case , as distinct from the case portrayed in Fig .

19 , he is worse off than if neither side had elected to attack . It is C ' s knowledge

of ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield