The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 23
... Bilateral Monopoly and the Competitive Output , " Quar- terly Journal of Economics , 63 : 376n6 ( August 1949 ) . When one wishes to persuade someone that he would not AN ESSAY ON BARGAINING 23.
... Bilateral Monopoly and the Competitive Output , " Quar- terly Journal of Economics , 63 : 376n6 ( August 1949 ) . When one wishes to persuade someone that he would not AN ESSAY ON BARGAINING 23.
Page 25
... bilateral monopoly problem is as follows . One member of the pair shifts his marginal cost curve so that joint profits are now zero at the output at which joint profits originally would have been maxi- mized . He does this through an ...
... bilateral monopoly problem is as follows . One member of the pair shifts his marginal cost curve so that joint profits are now zero at the output at which joint profits originally would have been maxi- mized . He does this through an ...
Page 35
... bilateral monopoly between firms , the ends of the bargaining range are points of zero profits for one or the other party ; and to settle for one's minimum position is no better than no settlement at all . But , apart from certain ...
... bilateral monopoly between firms , the ends of the bargaining range are points of zero profits for one or the other party ; and to settle for one's minimum position is no better than no settlement at all . But , apart from certain ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game