The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
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Page 32
... carry out one while A carries out the other , and can effectively threaten to abandon both un- less A carries out ... carried out . But if it costs 10 hours a week to be scoutmaster , and each considers it worth 8 hours of his time to ...
... carry out one while A carries out the other , and can effectively threaten to abandon both un- less A carries out ... carried out . But if it costs 10 hours a week to be scoutmaster , and each considers it worth 8 hours of his time to ...
Page 36
... carry it out.7 We are back again at the commitment . How can one commit himself in advance to an act that he would in fact prefer not to carry out in the event , in order that his commitment may deter the other party ? One can of course ...
... carry it out.7 We are back again at the commitment . How can one commit himself in advance to an act that he would in fact prefer not to carry out in the event , in order that his commitment may deter the other party ? One can of course ...
Page 187
... carried out is painful or costly to both sides . The purpose is deterrence ex ante , not revenge ex post . Making a credible threat involves proving that one would have to carry out the threat , or creating incentives for oneself or ...
... carried out is painful or costly to both sides . The purpose is deterrence ex ante , not revenge ex post . Making a credible threat involves proving that one would have to carry out the threat , or creating incentives for oneself or ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game