## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

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Page 95

8 and they receive the rewards denoted by the numbers contained in the

where their choices intersect . ... single choice for the other that “ wins ” for both of

them , we can arrange columns so that all the winning

.

8 and they receive the rewards denoted by the numbers contained in the

**cell**where their choices intersect . ... single choice for the other that “ wins ” for both of

them , we can arrange columns so that all the winning

**cells**lie along the diagonal.

Page 151

the penalty from one ' s own payoffs in all

strategy so selected . 24 Specifically , in Fig . 15 A , Row would commit himself to

ii by subtracting from his own payoffs in the first row sufficiently large quantities —

5 ...

the penalty from one ' s own payoffs in all

**cells**that do not correspond to thestrategy so selected . 24 Specifically , in Fig . 15 A , Row would commit himself to

ii by subtracting from his own payoffs in the first row sufficiently large quantities —

5 ...

Page 212

... offs in the original matrix , using the two parameters representing the

probability of “ irrational ” attack . The upper left

The lower right

four

... offs in the original matrix , using the two parameters representing the

probability of “ irrational ” attack . The upper left

**cell**in the matrix stays as it was .The lower right

**cell**has its pay - offs recomputed , as a weighted average of thefour

**cells**.### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield