## The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |

### From inside the book

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Page 48

2 but if East can effectively threaten the mutually undesirable a/?, he leaves North

only a

for East to commit his

2 but if East can effectively threaten the mutually undesirable a/?, he leaves North

only a

**choice**of afi or AB and North chooses the latter. Note that it is not sufficientfor East to commit his

**choice**in advance, as it was in Figure 1 ; he must commit ...Page 157

The threatener's first

expects the threat- Column sees that he ... that Row has a clearly determined

decision, but ...

The threatener's first

**choice**— to threaten or not — thus depends on what heexpects the threat- Column sees that he ... that Row has a clearly determined

**choice**that makes it inconsequential whether Column further narrows hisdecision, but ...

Page 217

Suppose R is given a free

and C can attack only after R has had an opportunity to make his

on it, and only if R has not attacked. We now build further on this game, by letting

...

Suppose R is given a free

**choice**, to attack or not, while C is constrained to wait ;and C can attack only after R has had an opportunity to make his

**choice**and acton it, and only if R has not attacked. We now build further on this game, by letting

...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

Bargaining Communication and Limited | 3 |

Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |

Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |

Copyright | |

9 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance Chapter choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome pair particular party payoff perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce relation requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic third threat threaten tion weapons yield