The Strategy of Conflict'In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject.' |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 18
Page 286
... clue points that way . Only a discriminatory clue can point to a concerted choice ; to deny the discrimination is to deny the premise that a clue can be jointly found and jointly acted on in the interest of an outcome that is jointly ...
... clue points that way . Only a discriminatory clue can point to a concerted choice ; to deny the discrimination is to deny the premise that a clue can be jointly found and jointly acted on in the interest of an outcome that is jointly ...
Page 299
... clue to common choice . Why not take the clue contained in the other cells , which seems to point toward ( ii , II ) ?? we ask him how much he'd pay for the privilege of playing the different vari- ants in place of the one with 5. ) If ...
... clue to common choice . Why not take the clue contained in the other cells , which seems to point toward ( ii , II ) ?? we ask him how much he'd pay for the privilege of playing the different vari- ants in place of the one with 5. ) If ...
Page 300
... clues are equally plausible in reverse , we are back to confusion . Only a discriminatory clue can point to a concerted choice , deny- ing the discrimination is denying the premise that a clue can be found and acted on jointly to ...
... clues are equally plausible in reverse , we are back to confusion . Only a discriminatory clue can point to a concerted choice , deny- ing the discrimination is denying the premise that a clue can be found and acted on jointly to ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game